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Chapter 1  | Introduction 
 
In ancient times, when a hungry man saw a beast or animal, he needed to decide 
whether he should fight against it to get the food. The potential gain is a bunch of 
meat and the potential loss is his life. Based on his past experience, the man starts to 
estimate the chance of each result and makes the final decision. Life or death, he has 
to make a choice under uncertainty. Today, when a person, say a man, enters a stock 
market, he needs to decide which stock to buy. The estimated chances of potential 
gains or losses are based on his understanding of the market. Like his ancestor in the 
forest, he needs to make a decision where each result has a chance to happen. During 
the history of mankind, decision making under uncertainty has been an eternal topic, 
from surviving to living a better life.  
The first formal attempt to study this problem dates back into the 17th century when 
some great mathematicians Blaise Pascal, Pierre de Fermat, and Johan de Wit 
developed a theory of rational decision making known as Expected Value Theory 
(EVT). According to EVT, an act is valued according to the sum of its probability-
weighted outcomes and a rational person should choose the act with the highest 
expected value in an uncertain environment. However, this theory was challenged by 
Bernoulli in the 18th century, who argued that utility increments should decrease with 
the wealth of the person, violating the constant utility increments implied by 
expected value. Bernoulli further developed Expected Utility Theory (EUT), where the 
probability-weighted average utility rather than probability-weighted outcome is 
used to evaluate an act. Kenyes (1921) and Knight (1921) first made a clear 
distinction between risk (known probability) and ambiguity (unknown probability), 
which shaped the development of decision theory afterwards. In 1961, Ellsburg 
proposed a classical paradox to illustrate the difference of decision making between 
risk and ambiguity. People tend to bet on events with known probability (risk) than 
on events with unknown probability (ambiguity). The study of decision making under 
ambiguity further developed afterwards. Among them are maximin expected utility 
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), the  -maxmin model (Ghiradato, Maccheroni & 
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Marinacci 2004), Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989) and the source method 
(Abdellaoui et al 2011).  
 
There has so far been no perfect model to explain or predict the behavior of human 
beings. One of the difficulties is that the cognitive process during decision under 
uncertainty is still a blackbox to be explored. Such a process is affected by emotions, 
cognitive abilities, bounded rationalities, environmental constraints and other 
psycholotical factors. Therefore, this thesis investigates decision under uncertainty 
from both economic and psychological perspectives. 
Chapter 2 discusses multiplier preferences, a model that describes behavior under 
ambiguity, where people have subjective beliefs but do not know exact probabilities. 
The subjective expected utility model (Savage 1954) prescribes that ambiguity should 
not affect a person’s preferences (only subjective beliefs matter), but numerous 
studies (most notably Ellsberg 1961) have found that people do behave differently 
when ambiguity is involved. Multiplier preferences are widely used in 
macroeconomic models, but they have not been applied in microeconomic settings, 
largely because they do not permit behavior in which people are ambiguity seeking. 
We give a preference foundation for an extension of this model, such that it allows for 
ambiguity seeking as well as ambiguity aversion. We then present a simple method to 
measure extended multiplier preferences, which is easy to apply and measures 
multiplier preferences at the individual subject level. Our method is illustrated in two 
large representative samples from the Dutch and the US population involving over 
5,000 subjects in total. Most subjects were moderately ambiguity averse, but between 
23% (Dutch sample) and 36% (US sample) were ambiguity seeking, which illustrates 
the desirability of our extension of multiplier preferences.  
Chapter 3 examines decisions under ambiguity when those decisions are taken under 
time pressure (TP). In behavioral economnics, it has long been understood that 
human memory and mental capacities are limited and often lead to suboptimal 
decisions. This suboptimality is especially pronounced when decisions have to be 
made under TP. Therefore, TP has received special attention throught the history of 
decision theory.  Many papers have investigated the effect of TP on decision under 
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risk, but this effect has not been studied under ambiguity. In a lab experiment with 
real incentives, subjects are asked to choose between risky and ambiguous bets. The 
ambiguous bets are based on the movement of the Amsterdam Stock Market Index 
(AEX), and therefore the probabilities associated with the outcomes were unknown. 
In the risky bets, however, outcomes are presented with their respective objective 
probabilities. In the treatment group, subjects have to state their preferences within a 
time limit. For the analysis of ambiguity, a new simplified method is introduced which 
relies on a tool called matching probabilities to measure ambiguity behavior. 
Ambiguity behavior can be dissected into two components: ambiguity aversion and 
ambiguity-generated insensitivity (a-insensitivity). Ambiguity aversion is an affective 
component that refers to how much less people like ambiguity as compared to risk, 
whereas a-insensitivity is a cognitive component indicating how much less people 
understand ambiguity compared to risk. The results of this experiment demonstrate 
that making choices under time pressure does not change how people react to 
ambiguity affectively; the ambiguity aversion factor remains unaffected. However, the 
a-insensitivity component is negatively impacted by time pressure. Therefore, the 
results agree with past research showing that cognitive faculties are compromised 
under time pressure. 
Chapter 4 discusses how people update their beliefs under ambiguity using three 
different approaches. One is the traditional Bayesian updating, where only ambiguity 
neutral behavior is accommodated. The other two approaches are non-Bayesian, 
introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) (GS) as well as Dempster (1967) and 
Shafer (1976) (DS) respectively, where both ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking 
behavior is accommodated. Under the framework of decision theory, this paper 
compares Bayesian and non-Bayesian updating and their numerical implications. 
Ambiguity attitudes affect not only static decisions, but also the way in which new 
information is incorporated. For an ambiguity averse (seeking) decision maker, GS 
updating leads to more pessimistic (optimistic) behavior than DS updating, and 
favorable or unfavorable information has bigger (smaller) impact on GS updating 
than on DS updating.   
Finally, Chapter 5 deals with the problem of intertemporal decisions, i.e. how people 
evaluate future outcomes. It introduces a new method to measure the temporal 
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discounting of money. Unlike preceding methods, this method requires neither 
knowledge nor measurement of utility. It is easier to implement, clearer to subjects, 
and requires fewer measurements than existing methods. Because the method 
directly measures discounting, and utility plays no role, it is called the direct method 
(DM). The basic idea of the DM is as follows. Assume that a decision maker is 
indifferent between: (a) an extra payment of $10 per week during weeks 1-30; and (b) 
the same extra payment during weeks 31-65.  Then the total discount weight of 
weeks 1-30 is equal to that of weeks 31-65.  We can derive the entire discount 
function from such equalities.  Knowledge of utility is not required because it drops 
from the equations.  Even though this method is elementary, it has not been known 
before. In an experiment, we compare it with a traditional, utility based, method (UM) 
and find that the DM needs fewer questions than the UM but gives similar results. 
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Chapter 2  | Measuring Ambiguity Attitude: 
(Extended) Multiplier Preferences for the 
American and the Dutch Population 
 
Joint work with Aurélien Baillon, Han Bleichrodt and Rogier Potter van Loon 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
While both the theoretical and the empirical literature on ambiguity are rich1, there is 
only limited interaction between the two. A reason is that most ambiguity models use 
concepts that are hard if not impossible to observe empirically. Empirical 
measurements of ambiguity have therefore resorted to pragmatic measures that lack 
a foundation in theory. The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap between theory 
and empirics. We use Hansen and Sargent’s (2001) multiplier preferences model, 
which captures ambiguity aversion by a single parameter, to derive a theoretically-
founded measure of ambiguity aversion. We extend the multiplier preference model 
to capture all kinds of ambiguity attitudes, we present a method to measure the 
ambiguity aversion parameter, and we apply this method in two large representative 
surveys. 
Multiplier preferences are widely used in macroeconomics and finance to permit that 
decision makers’ beliefs about economic phenomena are non-unique. In the 
multiplier preferences model, decision makers rank payoff profiles   according to the 
criterion: 
          
 
        
 
 
       ,                  (2.1) 
where   is a utility function,   is a subjective probability distribution on the states of 
the world,   is a behavioral parameter, and         is the relative entropy of any 
probability distribution   with respect to  . The intuition underlying Eq. (2.1) is that 
                                                             
1 See Trautman and van de Kuilen (2015) for a recent survey of the empirical literature and 
Machina and Siniscalchi (2014) for a survey of the theoretical literature. 
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the decision maker has some best guess   of the probability distribution, but he does 
not have full confidence in his guess and also considers other probability 
distributions p. The plausibility of these other distributions decreases with their 
distance from  , as measured by the relative entropy  . The parameter 
 
 
 captures the 
degree to which the decision maker takes alternative probability distributions into 
account. The lower is  , the more the decision maker trusts that   is the correct 
distribution. In the limit, if   goes to zero, Eq. (2.1) becomes subjective expected 
utility. 
The lack of trust decision makers have in their beliefs may result from ambiguity 
(Hansen and Sargent 2001). In empirical studies, most subjects are not neutral 
towards ambiguity, as assumed by expected utility, but are ambiguity averse. 
Multiplier preferences capture ambiguity aversion while remaining analytically 
convenient and easy to incorporate in economic models of aggregate behavior. 
However, they do not accommodate ambiguity seeking, which limits their 
applicability at the micro level where a wide range of ambiguity attitudes is typically 
observed and a substantial proportion of respondents is ambiguity seeking. 
This paper extends multiplier preferences to accommodate both ambiguity aversion 
and ambiguity seeking. We give a preference foundation of this extended model that 
complements Strzalecki (2011) and that makes multiplier preferences suitable for 
microeconomic applications. 
We then present a simple method to measure extended multiplier preferences. Our 
method is easy to apply and measures multiplier preferences at the individual subject 
level. Hence, we obtain an axiomatically founded measure of ambiguity aversion that 
can easily be used in empirical research and that captures the heterogeneity in 
individual ambiguity attitudes.  
We illustrate our method in two large representative samples of the Dutch and the US 
population involving over 5,000 subjects in total and provide the first micro estimates 
of (extended) multiplier preferences. Most subjects were moderately ambiguity 
averse, but between 23% (Dutch sample) and 36% (US sample) were ambiguity 
seeking. In both samples, we observed that education and income were uncorrelated 
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with ambiguity aversion but negatively correlated with the deviation from ambiguity 
neutrality.  
 
2.2 Extended Multiplier Preferences 
 
We use the Anscombe-Aumann setting. Let   be the state space, i.e. the set of all 
possible states of the world  .   can be finite or infinite. One state s will occur but the 
decision maker does not know which one.   denotes a sigma-algebra on  . Its 
elements are called events and are typically denoted  . The set of all countably 
additive probability measures on       is denoted by      and is endowed with the 
weak* topology. A probability measure        is absolutely continuous with respect 
to        if for all    ,        implies         Let      denote the set of all 
countably additive probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect 
to  . For any         , the relative entropy of   with respect to   is given by 
             
  
  
 
 
   if        and           otherwise. 
We denote the outcome set by  .      is the set of all simple lotteries on  . Elements 
of      are denoted   or  . The decision maker chooses between acts, finite-valued 
mappings from   to     , which are  -measurable. Acts are usually denoted   or  . 
For event  ,     denotes the act that gives      if     and      if    
  with    the 
complement of  . The set of all acts is . Acts have two stages: the first stage 
corresponds to the uncertainty modeled by S and the second stage to the risks 
modeled by     . The mixture act           for         is the act that assigns 
the lottery                 to state   for all    . The decision maker’s 
preferences over acts in  are denoted by  (with , , ≼, and ≺ defined as usual). A 
functional   represents  if       is such that              . 
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Definition 2.1: We call  extended multiplier preferences if  can be represented by 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
      
             
 
 
 
 
              
             
 
      
   
      
             
 
 
 
 
             
  
where   is a nonconstant expected utility functional,       , and    . We call 
these preferences robust if     and opportunity seeking if    . 
A decision maker whose preferences are opportunity seeking chooses the 
probabilities that will maximize his expected utility minus a cost, which depends on 
the distance between these probabilities and his best guess. A decision maker with 
robust preferences tries to find options that are maximally insensitive to remaining 
uncertainties. By contrast, an opportunity seeking decision maker is looking for 
possibilities to improve his expected utility and he values options for which the 
remaining uncertainties can lead to high expected utilities.  
An alternative interpretation of extended multiplier preferences approach comes 
from a comparison with                     , the Lagrange function deduced 
from minimizing (in the robust approach) or maximizing (in the opportunity seeking 
approach)         such that the relative entropy does not exceed a threshold 
           . This comparison shows that the multiplier parameter   
 
 
 is the 
Lagrange multiplier of the optimization problem and can be interpreted as the 
shadow price of relaxing the constraint imposed on the relative entropy (Hansen and 
Sargent, 2001).  
There is a third interpretation of the multiplier parameter as an index of ambiguity 
aversion. Lemma 2.1 in the Appendix shows that extended multiplier preferences are 
ordinally equivalent to Neilson’s (2010) second-order expected utility2 (SOEU) 
                                                             
2 SOEU shows that ambiguity attitudes can be modeled by relaxing the assumption of reduction of 
compound lotteries between the objective stage (the lottery     ) and the subjective stage (the 
subjective probability     ). Segal (1987) first made this point using rank-dependent utility in both 
stages. Dillenberger and Segal (2015) showed that Segal’s model also accommodates examples of 
ambiguity behavior proposed by Machina (2009, 2014) that most other ambiguity models cannot 
accomodate. 
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when   is exponential: 
       
            
       
          
  
and  ,  , and   as in Definition 1. Axiomatizations of SOEU were given by Grant, Polak, 
and Strzalecki (2009), Nau (2006), and Neilson (2010). We know from Pratt (1964) 
that under expected utility the exponential utility function is equivalent to constant 
absolute risk aversion. This implies that adding an amount   to all outcomes of the 
lotteries under comparison does not change the preferences between these lotteries. 
For the exponential function, the Arrow-Pratt index of risk attitude 
   
  
 is constant 
and equal to the exponential parameter. Under SOEU, we can give a similar 
interpretation to the exponential   function in terms of utility: adding the same 
(expected) utility to each state of the acts under comparison does not change the 
preferences between these acts. Grant and Polak (2013) coin the term constant 
absolute uncertainty aversion to describe this property. The index 
   
  
   is then an 
Arrow-Pratt index of ambiguity attitude. We used   instead of  , because   is a 
monotonic and continuous measure and, therefore, more convenient for statistical 
analysis.  
 
2.3 Axiomatization 
 
Strzalecki (2011) axiomatized extended multiplier preferences for    , i.e. for 
decision makers with robust preferences. We will characterize extended multiplier 
preferences, i.e. including the case of opportunity seeking (    . We do so by 
dropping uncertainty aversion (his A.5) from Strzalecki’s set of axioms and by 
replacing results in his proof that depend on this axiom by other results that do not 
depend on it.  
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We impose the following conditions on : 
1. Weak order:  is complete and transitive.  
2. Weak certainty independence: for all      , for all           and for all 
       ,                                         .  
3. Continuity: for all         , the sets {                      and 
{                      are closed.  
4. Monotonicity: for all       if           for all     then    .  
5. Nondegeneracy: there exist acts       such that       
6. Weak monotone continuity: for all      , for all       , and for all 
          with         and        ,     implies that there exists 
an    such that        .  
7. Sure thing principle: for all     and for all                        
  
   
    
An event is essential if there exist         such that        .  
 
Theorem 2.1: If   has at least three disjoint essential events3 then the following two 
statements are equivalent: 
1. ≽ is a continuous, nondegenerate weak order that satisfies weak certainty 
independence, monotonicity, weak monotone continuity and the sure thing 
principle. 
2. ≽ has an extended multiplier representation. 
 
                                                             
3 If only one event is essential then the Theorem also holds but the uniqueness properties are 
different. If exactly two disjoint events are essential then the sure thing principle should be 
strengthened to the hexagon condition (Wakker 1989). 
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Observation 2.1: Two triples         and            represent the same extended 
multiplier preference if and only if   and    are identical and there exist     and 
    such that         and       . 
 
All proofs are in Appendix. 
We can distinguish the robust and the opportunity seeking approaches using 
Schmeidler’s (1989) condition of ambiguity aversion and its counterpart of ambiguity 
seeking. 
 
Definition 2.2: Ambiguity aversion (seeking) holds if for all acts     in and for all   
in                           .  
 
Theorem 2.2: Under extended multiplier preferences, ambiguity aversion is 
equivalent to robust preferences and ambiguity seeking is equivalent to opportunity 
seeking preferences. 
According to Theorem 2.2, the sign of   determines whether an agent is ambiguity 
averse or ambiguity seeking. But for   to be a proper index of ambiguity aversion, it 
should also satisfy the property that a higher value represents more ambiguity 
aversion. Consider two decision makers         represented by preferences   . We 
use the definition of “more ambiguity averse” proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci 
(2002). 
 
Definition 2.3:   is more ambiguity averse than   if for all acts   in  and lotteries 
  in                  .  
 
This definition adapts the definition of “more risk averse” introduced by Yaari (1969) 
to ambiguity. It implies that the ambiguity attitudes of two decision makers can only 
be compared if they share the same beliefs (here, the same  ). Moreover, as shown by 
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Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002, Proposition 11), the decision makers need to have 
the same risk attitudes, which corresponds to their utility functions being cardinally 
equivalent:       if there exist     and     such that         .  
 
Theorem 2.3: Given two extended multiplier preferences   and   represented by 
           and           , the following two statements are equivalent: 
1.    is more ambiguity averse than  . 
2.      ,      , and       (if we scale utility such that      ). 
 
Theorem 2.3 shows that   is a proper measure of ambiguity aversion. 
 
2.4 Measuring Extended Multiplier Preferences 
 
2.4.1 Method 
Strzalecki (2011, Example 3) explained how the multiplier parameter   could be 
measured under the assumption that utility   is a power function. We describe an 
alternative method that makes no assumptions about utility and requires fewer 
questions. Because extended multiplier preferences are ordinally equivalent to SOEU 
with   exponential, we will display our results using SOEU for ease of understanding. 
Suppose that a ball will be drawn from an urn with an unknown number of yellow 
and purple balls. Let         where   stands for “the ball is yellow” and   for “the 
ball is purple”. The decision maker can win either $15 or nothing, depending on the 
color of the ball. Hence,         . The act    pays $15 if the ball is yellow and 
nothing otherwise and the act    pays $15 if the ball is purple and nothing otherwise. 
Each lottery from      can be written as       where   is the probability to get 15. 
We scale utility so that        and         . Then                    
     . 
Assume that            for some probability  . We call this probability   a matching 
probability of the acts    and   . Under SOEU, we obtain from       that      
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       . The second indifference,        , then implies                
      . We prove in the Appendix that this equation has a unique solution   for 
each value of        . If     , then     and the decision maker is indifferent 
between an objective and a subjective probability of ½  .  If     then    and  the 
decision maker prefers an objective probability of ½  to a subjective probability of ½ .. 
This corresponds to ambiguity aversion  Similarly,     implies ambiguity seeking 
       If    , preferences are extremely robust (ambiguity averse) and     . 
If    , preferences are extremely opportunity seeking and     . 
2.4.2 Calibration 
Observation 1 shows that the sign of the multiplier parameter does not depend on the 
scaling of the utility function, but its magnitude does. In the empirical study reported 
in Section 2.4.3, we scale utility such that the utility of initial wealth is 0 and that of 
      is 15. For any utility function    the multiplier parameter    can be computed 
from the   that we report below using    
    
            
. Because   depends only on 
the scaling of utility and not on utility curvature, it does not depend on a subject’s risk 
aversion. Hence, it can be used for correlation analysis if the same scaling is used for 
all subjects. 
2.4.3 Empirical Illustration 
Two surveys have been held in which subjects answered questions of the form 
described in section 2.4.1. Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2015) ran a survey 
among 1,900 participants of the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Study for the Social 
Sciences (LISS). Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2013) ran a 
similar survey among 3,300 participants of the American Life Panel (ALP)4. We 
illustrate our method by showing the   values obtain from the responses in these two 
datasets. 
 
                                                             
4 Both papers analyzed a subset of their respondents, excluding subjects who took too much or too 
little time in answering., For example. Dimmock et al. (2015) excluded more than half of their subjects 
as these were not incentivized. In our analyses, we chose to include all subjects as any exclusion 
criterion is to some extent arbitrary. The results we present were unaffected if we used the same 
inclusion criteria as Dimmock et al. (2013, 2015).  
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In both surveys, subjects had to choose between two urns: a known urn K and an 
ambiguous urn A. Urn K contained 100 yellow (orange) and purple balls in known 
proportions. Urn A contained 100 yellow and purple balls in unknown proportions. 
By default, purple was the winning color, but subjects could change the winning color 
to yellow. Only 1% of all subjects did so, which indicates that most subjects were not 
suspicious and had no preference between the two winning colors. This implies that 
       
The survey measured the matching probability   for which subjects were indifferent 
between urn A and urn K with       balls of their winning color. Subjects made a 
series of choices between urn A and urn K, where urn A remained the same while the 
proportion of winning balls in urn K changed depending on previous choices.  
At the end of the experiment, one randomly selected choice was played for real. A ball 
was drawn from the urn that the subject preferred in that choice. The subject 
received €15 euro (dollar) if the ball had his winning color and nothing otherwise. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the approached followed are discussed in Dimmock 
et al. (2013, 2015). 
 
Figure 2.1: Kernel density estimates of respondents'   values. The Epanechnikov 
function was used, with a kernel width of 0.07. The boxes at the upper and lower end 
indicate the proportion of subjects with   values greater than .8 and less than -.8/-.6. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the estimated distribution of   in the two datasets using a kernel 
density estimate. In the Dutch (US) dataset, the median value of    was equal to 0.05 
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(0.02)), which corresponds with a matching probability of 40.6% (47.0%). Both 
distributions are centered slightly to the right of zero and concentrated in the 
ambiguity averse domain. Still, 22.5% (35.9%) of subjects were found to be ambiguity 
seeking. The box at the far left of the distribution show that 6.2% (4.5%) of the 
subjects gave matching probabilities close to 1, which corresponds with a value of   
that is below -0.8 (-0.6)5. Similarly, the boxes on the far right indicate that 9.6% 
(3.6%) gave matching probabilities close to zero, which corresponds with a   value 
greater than 0.8. 
 
 Dutch dataset US dataset 
                    
     
Gender (female = 1)     0.012  0.002     0.053*** 0.011 
Age       0.070***          0.142***  0.032* 0.001 
High income  0.003     0.047**  0.020   0.060*** 
High education    0.003       0.064***    0.031*   0.064*** 
     
N    1,821    1,821  3,217 3,217 
Table 2.1: Correlations between demographic variables and ambiguity aversion ( ) 
and deviation from ambiguity neutrality (   ). *significant at 10% level, **5%, ***1%. 
 
As a further illustration, Table 2.1 shows correlations between   and demographic 
variables in the first and third column, and correlations between     and demographic 
variables in the second and fourth column. Correlations with     are also analyzed 
because some effects may be correlated with the deviation from ambiguity neutrality, 
rather than with the degree of ambiguity aversion. Such a deviation implies a 
violation of either probabilistic sophistication or dynamic consistency, two conditions 
that are generally considered normative. Ambiguity neutrality is therefore often 
                                                             
5 These thresholds are not of the same absolute value due to an asymmetry in the question design 
of Dimmock et al. (2013). 
 16 
 
perceived as the rational model of choice under uncertainty (e.g., Wakker 2010, p. 
326).  
In the Dutch sample, the only variable that is correlated with   is age, with older 
respondents being more ambiguity seeking. The second column shows that age is 
positively correlated with    , which suggests that they have more extreme ambiguity 
attitudes. Income and education are negatively correlated with the deviation from 
ambiguity neutrality, which seems consistent with the finding that people with higher 
cognitive abilities deviate less from models of rational choice (Frederick 2005, 
Dohmen et al. 2010).  
In the US sample, women are more ambiguity seeking, as are older and less educated 
people (marginally significant). Although there is no correlation between age and     
as in the Dutch dataset, the correlation coefficients for income and education are 
remarkably similar to their Dutch counterparts. All correlations are negative, 
indicating that those with higher income and education are closer to ambiguity 
neutrality. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Multiplier preferences, proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2001), are a popular model 
in macroeconomics and finance. In its original form, multiplier preferences only 
capture ambiguity aversion, which make them less suitable for applications at the 
micro level where substantial ambiguity seeking has also been observed. This chapter 
extends multiplier preferences to include ambiguity seeking and it gives a preference 
foundation for these extended multiplier preferences. We also show how extended 
multiplier preferences can be measured and thereby obtain an axiomatically-founded 
measure of ambiguity aversion that can easily be applied in empirical studies and that 
captures the substantial heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes that typically exists in 
micro data.  As an illustration, we applied our method to two large scale 
representative surveys, one from the Netherlands and one from the US. In both 
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samples a substantial fraction of the respondents was ambiguity seeking, which 
illustrates the desirability of our extension of multiplier preferences.  
 
Appendix 2: Proofs 
 
Lemma 2.1: Preferences  are extended multiplier preferences if and only if there 
exists     such that  can be represented by SOEU with        and    . 
Proof: 
The equivalence between robust preferences and            has been shown by 
Strzalecki (2011). It is based on Proposition 1.4.2 of Dupuis and Ellis (1997) stating 
that for all countably additive probability measures        and for all  -measurable 
functions  : 
                     
 
 
          
                   . 
For    , we apply this formula to        and      and we obtain: 
   
      
             
 
 
 
 
             
      
          
 
 
 
 
        
    
                 
 
 
   
                    
 
  
 
The last equality follows from   
       
      
 
 
      
 
    
       and 
           
                                . 
Hence, both robust and opportunity seeking preferences are equivalent to SOEU with 
an exponential  function.  □ 
  
Proof of Theorem 2.1: 
 18 
 
(ii) ⇒ (i). Because (ii) is a normalized niveloid that represents ≽ and u is nonconstant 
and affine, Lemma 28 in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) implies that ≽ 
is a constinuous, nondegenerate weak order that satisfies weak certainty 
independence and monotonicity. Because q is countably additive, ≽ satisfies uniform 
continuity by Theorem 5.4 in Krantz et al. (1971). Finally, by Proposition 1.4.2 in 
Dupuis and Ellis (1997), (ii) is equivalent to a second order expected utility 
representation. Consequently, the sure thing principle must hold. 
We show that (i) ⇒ (ii) by closely following Strzalecki’s proof without imposing 
uncertainty aversion. First we introduce some new notation. Let       denote the set 
of all real-valued  -measurable simple functions6 and let         denote the set of 
functions in       that take values in a convex set     Let  denote the set of 
finite partitions of   that contain at least three essential events. For all     , let 
     be the algebra generated by   and let   denote the set of acts in  that are 
measurable with respect to    .  
By Lemmas 25 and 28 of Maccheroni et al. , there exist a real-valued nonconstant 
affine function   on      and a normalized real-valued functional             
where  is the range of         and such that for all acts      ,   ≽   iff 
              and                           for all         , 
     and        . 
Theorem 1 in Grant, Polak, and Strzalecki (2009) ensures that for finite   ≽ can be 
represented by                   with   nonconstant and affine and with range 
  and    continuous, nondecreasing, and with at least three    nonconstant. Weak 
certainty independence then ensures that indifference curves in the utility space are 
parallel and have common supporting hyperplanes at the set of constant vectors in 
  . By the proof of Theorem 3 in Grant et al. it follows that for all     the 
restriction of ≽ to   can be represented by                       with    
nonconstant and affine,   continuous and strictly increasing, and measure 
              such that at least three events in   are nonzero. In applying 
Theorem 3, we replace uncertainty aversion and their Axiom A.7 by weak certainty 
independence. Uncertainty aversion is used in the application of Theorem 3 in Debreu 
                                                             
6 A function is simple if it takes no more than countably many distinct values. 
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and Koopmans (1982) to derive differentiability of the functions     However, as 
noted by Grant et al. and Maccheroni et al. ( p.1475, 1491), weak certainty 
independence implies Lipschitz continuity and hence differentiability. By Theorem 4 
in Strzalecki (2011), the proof of which does not use uncertainty aversion, ≽ can be 
represented by second order expected utility                   with        
and  continuous and strictly increasing.   is countably additive by uniform 
continuity (Villegas 1964, Theorem 1). Moreover, if         and            both 
represent ≽ then there exist             such that            
                   for all   in . 
  represents ≽ and is translation invariant, i.e. for all       and   such that 
                for all    ,               iff                 
                   . It then follows that for all acts       and   such 
that                 for all    ,                  
 
                
 
 
iff                   
 
                 
 
. 
Hence,         and          defined by                      are both 
SOEU representations of ≽. Consequently,                     . Because  is 
nonconstant, if  is unbounded, it follows from Corollary 1 in Aczél (1966, Section 
3.1.3) that  equals  . If  is bounded then because   is nonconstant Theorem 4 in 
Aczél (2005) implies      on the interior of . Because  is continuous, the 
extension to all of  follows. 
By Proposition 1.4.2 in Dupuis and Ellis (1997) and Lemma 2.1, we then obtain the 
extended multiplier representation.  □ 
  
Proof of Observation 2.1: 
The proof of Theorem 2.1 already showed that the probability measure   is unique 
and that the utility function   is unique up to positive affine transformations. We also 
know that for       and    ,       . Because    
       
        
       
  , it follows from the uniqueness properties of   that    
 
 
 . □  
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Proof of Theorem 2.2: 
Ambiguity aversion states that preferences are convex. Hence it is equivalent to a 
concave representation. Since   is linear with respect to mixture of lotteries, 
ambiguity aversion is equivalent to the SOEU with   concave, which means    . 
The opposite reasoning applies to ambiguity seeking. □  
 
Proof of Theorem 2.3: 
(2)  (1) is trivial. Assume (1). It implies       (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, 
Proposition 11). We scale utility such that      . Recode lotteries into expected 
utilities. Using the second-order expected utility formulation of extended variational 
preferences and the results of Yaari (1969), we immediately obtain       and   
more concave than  , which implies      .                        □ 
 
Proof that there is a unique solution   for each value of r. 
      and         jointly imply                      , which is equivalent 
to                if     and to  
                              otherwise. Hence,  
    if       
   
                
   
 if          
The proof that   is continuous and decreasing as a function of   is elementary. By the 
intermediate value theorem, there is a unique solution   for each        .     □ 
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Chapter 3  | Ambiguity Attitude under Time 
Pressure7 
 
Joint work with Aurélien Baillon, Asli Selim, & Peter P. Wakker 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines decisions under ambiguity when those decisions are taken 
under time pressure (TP). We aim to contribute both to the literature on ambiguity 
and to that on TP. Decision researchers have long recognized that real life decisions 
have to be performed under circumstances that are far from ideal, and that 
environmental constraints have significant impact on the quality and the outcome of 
decisions. Yet, for the sake of simplification, most economic studies have disregarded 
environmental constraints. Time pressure is one such important environmental 
constraint. For some professions, such as stockbrokers, emergency room doctors and 
fire fighters to name a few, TP is ubiquitous. Therefore, taking TP into account 
improves the relevance of decision theory to real life decisions. 
In behavioral economics, it has long been understood that human memory and 
mental capacities are limited and often lead to suboptimal decisions. This 
suboptimality is signaled by the many violations of elementary rationality principles 
that have been widely documented for human decisions (Kahneman, 2011). 
Consequently, the classical models of decision making, which describe the rational 
homo economicus, fail to predict many of our decisions, and many alternative models 
have been developed to capture our suboptimal decisions. The deviations from 
rationality are especially pronounced when decisions have to be made under TP. 
Therefore, TP has received special attention throughout the history of decision 
theory—as yet mostly in the psychological literature—because, in addition to its 
direct practical relevance, it provides a good context for studying and learning about 
heuristics and suboptimal decisions. 
                                                             
7 Chen Li made helpful comments 
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TP enhances the use of simple noncompensatory decision heuristics, which efficiently 
lead to good but not optimal decisions (satisficing; Simon, 1982). Although simplified 
heuristics actually improve our decisions under some specific circumstances 
(Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs 2011; Wilson & Schooler, 1991), in most cases they 
lead to bad decisions. TP usually aggravates violations of rationality principles. This 
general finding has been investigated and confirmed in many decision contexts; see 
the general TP survey by Ariely & Zakay (2001).8 
In addition to the aforementioned contexts, many papers have investigated the effects 
of TP on decision making under risk (uncertainty with known probabilities), 
confirming the above general findings.9 We will investigate the effects of TP on 
decisions under ambiguity, where no probabilities are known for the uncertain 
events faced. Closest to our study is Young et al. (2012), in which the authors use 
prospect theory to study the effects of TP as we will do, except that they focus on risk 
instead of ambiguity. 
Since Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) it has been understood that ambiguity is 
more prevailing and is more important than risk. However, as ambiguity is more 
difficult to analyze, the development of this field is relatively new (Gilboa 1987; 
Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989; Schmeidler 1989; Tversky & Kahneman 1992; see Etner, 
Jeleva, & Tallon (2012) and Trautmann & van de Kuilen (2013) for recent surveys). 
For this reason, TP has not yet been investigated for ambiguity. 
In our analysis of TP, we will consider two components of ambiguity. The first 
component reflects the well-known aversion to ambiguity. Ellsberg (1961) showed 
that people are mostly ambiguity averse, i.e., they dislike it more than risk. Aversion 
to ambiguity is empirically prevailing, but recent empirical studies have shown that 
there can be systematic ambiguity seeking in many situations (Binmore, Stewart, & 
Voorhoeve 2012; Charness, Karni, & Levin 2013; Ivanov 2011; reviewed by 
Trautmann & van de Kuilen 2013). 
                                                             
8  Further references include Ordonez & Benson (1997) for consumer decisions, Reutskaja, Nagel, 
& Camerer (2011) for search dynamics, and several experimental studies in games (Dror, Busemeyer, 
& Basola 1999; Kocher & Stutter 2006; Sutter, Kocher, & Strauss 2003; Tinghög et al. 2013). 
9  See the references in Ariely & Zakay (2001), and Chandler & Pronin (2012) Kocher, Pahlke, & 
Trautmann (2013), Maule, Hockey, & Bdzola (2000), and Payne, Bettman, & Luce (1996). 
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The second component of ambiguity that we will consider is called ambiguity-
generated insensitivity, or a-insensitivity for short. It is a cognitive component, 
reflecting to what extent people do not understand uncertainty and are insensitive to 
changes in uncertainty-information. A-insensitivity is a relative component that 
indicates how much less people understand uncertainty than they understand risk, 
just as how ambiguity aversion shows how much less people like ambiguity than they 
like risk. Empirical studies have commonly confirmed the importance of a-
insensitivity for understanding empirical data on ambiguity (Baillon, Cabantous, & 
Wakker 2012; Trautmann & van de Kuilen 2013; Wakker 2010 §10.4.2). One 
contribution of our paper is a simplified method for measuring the two 
aforementioned components. Our method differs from the method of Abdellaoui et al. 
(2011), and its simplification by Dimmock, Kouwenberg, & Wakker (2013), by not 
requiring any estimation of subjective probabilities. It formalizes tests used by 
Baillon & Bleichrodt (2013). We introduce this method and provide global source-
dependent indexes of ambiguity attitudes that are not tied to particular events, in 
§3.2. Thus, our indexes are not ad hoc but have decision-theoretic foundations. 
The new ambiguity theories are especially relevant to finance. In our experiment, 
subjects have to make decisions about the performance of the AEX (Amsterdam stock 
exchange) index. As for most uncertain events, neither we nor the subjects know the 
probabilities of future stock movements, the economy being in a state it was never in 
before. In the central treatment in our experiment, subjects have to make their 
decisions under TP. We compare this treatment with several control treatments and 
investigate the effects of ambiguity and learning on decision making. 
For our understanding of TP it is important to know how TP is associated with 
ambiguity attitudes, given the ubiquity of ambiguity in all our decisions. Our main 
finding will be that TP affects the cognitive component of a-insensitivity, but not the 
aversion component. When subjects must decide fast, they understand and process 
the uncertain information to a lesser extent, but they do not feel more or less aversion. 
Therefore, our results indicate that future studies on TP may want to focus on 
cognitive components of ambiguity rather than ambiguity aversion, and that the 
drawbacks of TP can primarily be mitigated by increasing knowledge and 
understanding, rather than by neutralizing unreasonable dislike. 
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Our findings are, obviously, also relevant to the field of ambiguity. In their general 
survey of TP, which, of course, could not yet incorporate ambiguity, Ariely & Zakay 
(2001) noted that TP provides an easy way to generate stress, which enhances the 
use of suboptimal cognitive processes, cognitive biases, and errors. Hence, TP 
provides an easy tool to investigate the role of biases in ambiguous decisions. Our 
results confirm Ariely & Zakay’s (2001) findings for ambiguity and underscore the 
importance of the cognitive ambiguity-sensitivity component by showing that it is the 
primary component associated with bounded rationality. 
 
3.2 Measuring Ambiguity Attitudes: Theory 
 
For each subject, in each of three parts, we consider a triple of exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive uncertain events E1, E2, and E3, always referring to changes in the 
AEX index. For instance, in Part 2, we have   = (,0.2),    = [0.2,0.2], and    = 
(0.2,+), where intervals describe percentage increases in the AEX index.     denotes 
the union      , where i  j is implicit. For each event E (E =    or E =   ) we define 
its matching probability m (m =   or m =   ) by: 
Receiving €20 under event E is equivalent to receiving €20 with probability m.  (3.1) 
In each case it is understood that the complementary payoff is nil. 
The more ambiguity averse a person is the lower the matching probabilities will be. 
Hence, the following index of ambiguity aversion is plausible: 
Definition 3.1. The ambiguity aversion index is defined as 
               ,                                                     (3.2) 
where      = (        )/3 denotes the average single-element-event matching 
probability, and      = (           )/3 denotes the average two-element-event 
matching probability. Under expected utility (Savage 1954),       = 1/3 and       = 2/3. 
Hence, then b = 0, reflecting ambiguity neutrality. This index has been suggested 
before, always under the assumption of expected utility under risk (Dow & Werlang 
1992; Schmeidler 1989 pp. 572, 574; explained in our Appendix). Under Schmeidler’s 
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(1989) model, his ambiguity aversion (called uncertainty aversion there) implies b > 
0, and his ambiguity neutrality implies b = 0, and his ambiguity seeking implies b < 0 
(Observation A.2). Observation A.1 in the appendix will show that index b is a 
pragmatic version of Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) ambiguity aversion index. This index is 
based on a decision-theoretic justification that does not require a commitment to 
expected utility under risk (or ambiguity). 
Insensitivity refers to a regression-to-the-mean type of effect, where ambiguity 
weights move towards fifty-fifty. It leads to relatively large values of        and 
relatively low values of       . It is plausible to have an index that is increasing in the 
former, but decreasing in the latter. This is reflected by the following definition: 
 
Definition 3.2. The ambiguity-generated insensitivity ((a-)insensitivity) index is 
defined as 
                 ,                                                     (3.3) 
Under Savage’s expected utility, a = 0. Observation A.1 will show that this index, again, 
is a pragmatic version of Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) a-insensitivity index, with a 
decision-theoretic justification that does not require expected utility under risk. 
 
3.3 Experiment: Method 
 
Participants 
N = 104 subjects participated (56 male, median age 20). They were all students of a 
Dutch university and were recruited from a subject pool. 
Procedure 
Computers were separated by wooden panels to minimize interaction between 
subjects. A brief set of instructions were read aloud, and tickets with ID numbers 
were handed out. Subjects typed in their ID numbers to start the experiment. The 
subjects were randomly allocated to treatment groups through their ID numbers. 
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Talking was not allowed during the experiment. Instructions were given with detailed 
information about the payment process, user interface, and the type of questions 
subject would face. The subjects could ask questions to the experimenters at any time. 
In each session, all subjects started the experiment at the same time. 
Stimuli: Within- and between-subject treatments 
TABLE 3.1: Organization of the experiment 
                 Within subject 
Between subject 
Part 1 (Training) Part 2 Part 3 
Time pressure group No time pressure Time pressure  No time pressure 
Control group No time pressure No time pressure No time pressure 
 
The experiment consisted of three parts, each containing eight questions. Table 3.1 
shows the design of the experiment. The first part served for training purposes. All 
subjects faced the same set of decision tasks, the only difference being that, in the 
second part of the experiment, the subjects in the time pressure (TP) treatment had 
to make their choices under time pressure. 
In the TP treatment, we took two measures to make sure that TP would not have any 
effects in Part 1 and 3. First, we imposed a two-minute break after Parts 1 and 2, to 
avoid spill-over of stress from Part 2 to Part 3. Second, we did not tell the subjects 
they will be put under TP prior to Part 2, so as to avoid stress generated by such an 
announcement in Part 1 (Ordonez & Benson 1997). There were 42 subjects in the 
control treatment and 62 in the TP treatment. The TP sample had more subjects 
because it is more interesting, and we expected more variance in it. 
 
Stimuli: Choice lists 
In each question, subjects were asked to choose between two options: 
 
 27 
 
OPTION 1:  You win €20 if the AEX (Amsterdam stock exchange) index 
increases/decreases by more/less than XX% between the beginning and the end of 
the experiment, and nothing otherwise. 
 
OPTION 2:  You win €20 with p% probability and nothing otherwise. 
 
Thus, in each question, the uncertainty that subjects faced for the first option 
concerned the variation of the AEX index between the beginning and the end of the 
experiment. Further details are given later. 
We used these choice questions in a choice list so as to infer the value of p that gives 
indifference (Figure 3.1). To be more precise, subjects were asked to state which one 
of these two options they preferred for different values of p, ascending from 0 to 100. 
The midpoint between the two values of p where they switched preference was taken 
as the indifference point, and this indifference probability was treated as the 
matching probability of the AEX event. 
To help subjects answer the questions quickly, which was crucial under TP, the 
experimental webpage allowed them to state their preferences with a single click. For 
example, if they clicked on Option 2 when the probability of winning was 50%, then 
for all p > 50%, the option boxes for Option 2 were automatically filled out and for all 
p < 50% the option boxes for Option 1 were automatically filled out. This procedure 
also precluded violations of stochastic dominance by preventing multiple preference 
switches. After clicking on their choices, subjects clicked on a “Submit” button to 
move to the next question. The response times were also tracked. 
 
Figure 3.1: Screenshot of the experiment software for single event   in Part 1 
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Figure 3.2: Screenshot of the experiment software for composite event     in Part 1 
 
 
Stimuli: Time pressure 
TP was imposed by setting a 25-second time limit by which subjects had to submit 
their choices. A timer was displayed showing the time left to answer. If subjects failed 
to submit their choices before the time limit expired, their choices would be 
registered but not be paid. This happened only 5 out of the 496 times (62 subjects  8 
choices). In a pilot, the average response time without TP was 36 seconds, and 
another session of the pilot showed that, under a 30-second time limit, subjects did 
not experience much TP. Therefore, we decided to set the time limit to 25 seconds. 
Stimuli: Uncertain events 
In each part we consider a triple of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, called 
single events, and unions of pairs of such events, called composite events. See Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Single AEX-change events for different parts 
 Event E1 Event E2 Event E3 
Part 1 (,0.4) [0.4,0.1] (0.1,) 
Part 2 (,0.2) [0.2,0.2] (0.2,) 
Part 3 (,0.1) [0.1,0.3] (0.3,) 
 
For each part, we considered all six nontrivial events generated by unions of the three 
single events, of which two were repeated to test consistency. This results in eight 
questions per part. The order in which the subjects faced the corresponding 
prospects was randomized for each subject within each part. Table 3.3 lists all events. 
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Table 3.3: List of events on which the AEX prospects were based 
Part Prospect 
number 
Event Event description 
1 
(Training) 
1 E1 the AEX decreases by strictly more than 0.4% 
2 E1 the AEX decreases by strictly more than 0.4% 
3 E2 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.4% or increases by 
less than 0.1% 
4 E3 the AEX increases by strictly more than 0.1% 
5 E12 the AEX either increases by less than 0.1% or decreases 
6 E23 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.4% or increases 
7 E23 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.4% or increases 
8 E13 the AEX either decreases by strictly more than 0.4% or 
increases by strictly more than 0.1% 
2 
1 F1 the AEX decreases by strictly more than 0.2% 
2 F2 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.2% or increases by 
less than 0.2% 
3 F2 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.2% or increases by 
less than 0.2% 
4 F3 the AEX increases by strictly more than 0.2% 
5 F12 the AEX either increases by less than 0.2% or decreases 
6 F12 the AEX either increases by less than 0.2% or decreases 
7 F23 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.2% or increases 
8 F13 the AEX either decreases by strictly more than 0.2% or 
increases by strictly more than 0.2% 
3 
1 G1 the AEX decreases by strictly more than 0.1% 
2 G2 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.1% or increases by 
less than 0.3% 
3 G3 the AEX increases by strictly more than 0.3% 
4 G3 the AEX increases by strictly more than 0.3% 
5 G12 the AEX either increases by less than 0.3% or decreases 
6 G23 the AEX either decreases by less than 0.1% or increases 
7 G13 the AEX either decreases by strictly more than 0.1% or 
increases by strictly more than 0.3% 
8 G13 the AEX either decreases by strictly more than 0.1% or 
increases by strictly more than 0.3% 
 
Stimuli: Avoiding middle bias 
A problem that using choice lists brings with it is the middle bias: subjects mostly 
choose the options, in our case the preference switch, that are located in the middle of 
the range provided (Erev & Ert 2013; Poulton 1989). TP can be expected to augment 
this bias. Had we used a common equally-spaced choice list with, say, 5% incremental 
steps, then the middle bias would have moved matching probabilities in the direction 
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of 50% (both for the single and composite events). This bias would have enhanced 
the main phenomenon found in this paper, a-insensitivity, and render our findings 
less convincing. To get around this problem, we designed choice lists that are not 
equally spaced. In our design, the middle bias enhances matching probabilities 1/3 
for single events and probabilities 2/3 for composite events. Thus, the middle bias 
enhances additivity of the matching probabilities, decreases a-insensitivity and 
moves our a-insensitivity index towards 0. It makes findings of nonadditivity and a-
insensitivity all the more convincing. 
 
Stimuli: Further questions 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to report their age, gender, and 
nationality, and to assess their knowledge of the AEX index from 1 (“I don’t know this 
index at all”) to 5 (“I know this index very well”). The median self-assessed 
knowledge was 2 and the maximum was 4, suggesting that most subjects were 
unfamiliar with the events, which would further enhance the experience of ambiguity. 
 
Incentives 
Subjects received a show-up fee of €5. For each subject, one preference (i.e., one row 
of one choice list) was randomly selected to be played for real at the end of the 
experiment. If subjects preferred the bet on the stock market index, then the outcome 
was paid according to the change in the stock market index during the duration of the 
experiment. Bets on the given probabilities were settled using dice. In the 
instructions of the experiment, subjects were presented with two examples to 
familiarize them with the payment scheme. If the time deadline for a TP question had 
not been met, the worst outcome (no payoff) resulted. Therefore, it was in the 
subjects’ interest to submit their choices on time. 
 
Analysis 
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We will first analyze response time, to verify that subjects answered faster in the TP 
treatment. We will then turn to matching probabilities. As the first part served to 
familiarize subjects with the tasks, we will only analyze the matching probabilities of 
Part 2 and 3. For some events we elicited the matching probabilities twice to test for 
consistency, since TP can be expected to decrease consistency. In the rest of the 
analysis, we only use the first matching probability elicited for each event. By 
monotonicity, the matching probability of a composite event should not be below the 
matching probability of either one of its two constituents. Thus, we can test 
monotonicity six times in each part. We will run non-parametric analysis to study 
whether time pressure had an impact on monotonicity violations. 
We computed ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity indexes as explained in Section 
3.2. A-insensitivity predicts that matching probabilities of single events,  ,  , and 
  , are higher than they are under ambiguity neutrality (when their average is 1/3) 
and a-insensitivity is increasing in these values. The matching probabilities of 
composite events,   ,   ,   , are lower than they are under ambiguity neutrality 
(when their average is 2/3), and it is decreasing in these values. Ambiguity aversion 
predicts that all matching probabilities are relatively low, and our index is decreasing 
in all of these. We will use an ANOVA and two-sided t-tests to study the impact of time 
pressure. As robustness checks, we will then run an ANCOVA (adding control 
variables). Moreover, 5 subjects in the TP treatment did not submit one of their 
matching probabilities on time. We did not exclude these subjects from our analyses, 
although excluding them would not affect any of our conclusions. 
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3.4 Experiment: Results 
 
3.4.1 Response time 
The average response time in the training part is more than 25 seconds, but it 
strongly decreases in both the control and the TP treatment in the second part. An 
ANOVA for repeated measures (with treatment as a between-subject factor, part and 
event as within subject factors, and with the interaction of treatment with the two 
within-subject factors) shows that only the part in which an answer was made and 
the interaction of part with treatment had a significant impact on the response time 
(part:   =118.73 p<0.01; part*treatment:   =6.24, p<0.01). Subsequent pairwise 
comparisons using t-tests with the Bonferroni correction for multiple testing show: (a) 
For the control treatment, the response time is highest for Part 1 (      = 6.00 and 
7.22 against Parts 2 and 3 respectively, p < 0.01 both times), but it does not differ 
between Parts 2 and 3 (     = 2.12, p = 0.11); (b) for the TP treatment, the response 
time is highest in Part 1 (     = 12.28 and 10.00 against Parts 2 and 3, respectively, p 
< 0.01in both cases) and is lowest in Part 2 (     = −2.57, p = 0.04 against Part 3). The 
response time of the TP treatment differs from the response time of the control 
treatment only in Part 2, where it is shorter as would be expected (     = 3.21, p < 
0.01). 
Table 3.4: Response time 
  
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 
TP treatment 
Average 28.14 12.72 15.04 
Median 21.00 12.00 12.00 
STD 21.98 5.27 11.92 
 
Percentage ≥ 25s 40 0 14 
Control treatment 
Average 25.79 16.63 14.30 
Median 20.00 13.00 11.00 
STD 19.24 13.47 11.58 
 
Percentage ≥ 25s 35 15 10 
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3.4.2 Consistency and monotonicity 
 
An ANOVA for repeated measures (with treatment as a between-subject factor, event 
and repetition as within subject factors, and with the interaction of treatment with 
the two within-subject factors) shows that neither repetition (whether the matching 
probability was elicited the first time or the second time) nor its interaction with 
treatment is significant. If we still carry out pairwise comparisons with the 
Bonferroni correction, we find one difference, in one of the two tests in Part 2 for the 
TP treatment: the second matching probability m13 is higher than the first one (mean 
difference = 0.03;      = −2.22; p = 0.03). The other differences are not significant. 
A similar pattern is found within the monotonicity tests. Out of 6 monotonicity checks, 
the average number of violations is 0.60 in Part 2 for the TP treatment, while it is only 
0.31 in Part 3 for the same treatment and 0.34 and 0.16 in Parts 2 and 3, respectively, 
for the control treatment. The difference is marginally significant in the between-
subject test (Mann-Whitney U test comparing the TP treatment and the control 
treatment in Part 2; Z = −1.79, p = 0.0710) and significant in the within-subject test 
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing Part 2 and Part 3 for the TP treatment; Z = 
−2.31, p = 0.03). 
                                                             
10 The difference is significant under one-sided testing, which is justified here because the 
direction of difference was predicted.  
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3.4.3 Ambiguity attitudes 
Surprisingly, we do not find ambiguity aversion, and cannot reject the null of 
ambiguity neutrality, in any treatments or parts. There is even a trend towards 
ambiguity seeking, reaching marginal significance in Part 2 of the TP treatment and 
Part 3 of the control treatment. By Observation A.2, our result also falsifies the 
ambiguity aversion predicted by Dow & Werlang (1992), Schmeidler (1989), and 
others. Table 3.5 displays corresponding statistics. An ANOVA for repeated measures 
(with treatment as a between-subject factor, and part as a within-subject factor, and 
with their interaction) shows that only the interaction of part with treatment had an 
impact on the ambiguity aversion index b (   = 6.13, p = 0.02). Subsequent pairwise 
comparisons show that index b is lower in Part 3 than in Part 2 (     = 2.10, p = 0.04) 
for the control treatment. Thus, subjects of the control treatment became slightly 
more ambiguity seeking in Part 3. Adding age, gender, nationality (Dutch / non-Dutch) 
and self-assessed knowledge of the AEX index as control variables do not change any 
of the results. As a by-product, age turns out to be significant in the ANCOVA, (   = 
4.97, p = 0.03) with older subjects having higher b indexes. 
 
Table 3.5: ambiguity aversion indices b 
  
Part 2 Part 3 
TP treatment 
Average –0.08 –0.06 
Median –0.07 –0.06 
STD 0.24 0.23 
t-statistics –2.65 –1.91 
df 61 61 
p 0.01 0.06 
Control treatment 
Average –0.07 –0.11 
Median –0.08 –0.10 
STD 0.21 0.24 
t-statistics –2.01 –3.01 
df 41 41 
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p 0.051 < 0.01 
 
We find a-insensitivity (a > 0) in all questions (see Table 3.6). The insensitivity index 
is between 0.15 and 0.17 for Parts 2 and 3 of the control treatment, and also for Part 3 
of the TP treatment. An ANOVA for repeated measures (with treatment as a between-
subject factor, and part as a within-subject factor, and with their interaction) shows 
that the part in which the a-insensitivity index was measured and the interaction of 
part with treatment had an impact on indexes a (part:    = 5.89, p = 0.02; 
part*treatment:    = 9.17, p < 0.01). Subsequent pairwise comparisons confirm that 
there is much more a-insensitivity for the TP questions (Part 2 of TP treatment), with 
a = 0.35. It is different both in a between-subject comparison (Part 2 of control 
treatment versus TP treatment;      = −2.29, p = 0.02) and in a within-subject 
comparison (Part 2 versus Part 3 of TP treatment;      = −4.33, p < 0.01). The 
direction and the significance of our results on a-insensitivity are robust to the 
addition of control variables (age, gender, nationality, and knowledge of the AEX 
index). 
 
Table 3.6: a-insensitivity indexes a 
  
Part 2 Part 3 
TP treatment 
Average 0.35 0.17 
Median 0.35 0.11 
STD 0.44 0.45 
t-statistics 6.21 2.96 
df 61 61 
p < 0.01 < 0.01 
Control treatment 
Average 0.15 0.17 
Median 0.07 0.21 
STD 0.43 0.41 
t-statistics 2.21 2.67 
df 41 41 
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p 0.03 0.01 
 
 
3.4.4 Summary and discussion of experiment 
The results on response times, consistency, and monotonicity all confirm Ariely & 
Zakay’s (2001) observation that TP aggravates biases and irrationalities: As regards 
response times, subjects need more time in the training questions, and use less time 
in the TP questions. Consistency is violated only in the TP questions, and violations of 
monotonicity are observed most frequently in the TP questions. The enhanced 
irrationalities and biases increase a-insensitivity (index a) in the TP questions, but do 
not affect ambiguity aversion (index b).  
All results on TP questions are confirmed by both between-subject and within-subject 
analyses. The absence of ambiguity aversion is not surprising in view of the recent 
studies that also found similar deviations, especially since we used natural events 
rather than Ellsberg urns, which increases ambiguity aversion due to contrast effects 
(Fox & Tversky 1995). Finally, the reduction of ambiguity aversion in Part 3 of the 
control treatment suggests that learning increases familiarity, in agreement with the 
familiarity bias (Chew, Ebstein, & Zhong 2012; Fox & Levav 2000; Kilka & Weber 
2001). 
Similar to our results, Young et al. (2012) also found that TP increases insensitivity in 
their context of risk, but only over the loss domain. For gains, they found no 
significant change in insensitivity. The effects of TP on risk aversion are not clear and 
can go either direction (Young et al. 2012; Kocher, Pahlke, & Trautmann 2013). 
Kocher et al. (2013) find increased insensitivity towards outcomes under TP. 
 
 39 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
We have investigated the effects of TP on ambiguity attitudes. TP does not affect 
ambiguity aversion, but leads to an increase in insensitivity (treating events too much 
as “fifty-fifty”), as confirmed by both within and between subject analyses. Our 
findings provide clear evidence that the cognitive insensitivity component of 
ambiguity is important, and that it is more closely associated with cognitive 
limitations and bounded rationality than the ambiguity aversion component is. Given 
the ubiquity of TP and ambiguity, our findings contribute to the understanding of 
human decisions. 
 
 Appendix 3: Estimating Ambiguity Attitudes 
Our technique with triples of disjoint events shows a new way to conveniently 
measure ambiguity attitudes using the matching-probability function m. Under most 
nonexpected utility theories, m captures the ambiguity attitude (Wakker 2010 
Example 11.2.2; Dimmock, Kouwenberg, & Wakker 2013 Theorem 5.1). The lower m 
is, the more ambiguity aversion there is, and the more inverse-S shaped m is, the 
more insensitivity there is. We next consider Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) indexes, 
applied separately to triples   ,   , and    . For their calculations on general data sets, 
Abdellaoui et al. use best approximations 
                                                                                     
say by minimizing quadratic distances, as in regular regressions. Here  > 0 and   are 
constants, and P is an additive probability measure. P need not be a subjective 
probability reflecting any subjective state of belief, but it is purely choice-based, 
justified by Chew & sagi's (2008) exchangeability conditions. 
In our data set, we can directly obtain an estimation of   from   ,   , and     (without 
estimating the P(E)s and quadratic fitting), from the equation, implied by Eq. A.1: 
                                                                                
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Proof: With Eq. A.1 as a deterministic model, the left-hand side equals            
                                  
We similarly obtain a second estimation of   from    and   , and a third one from    
and   . Our final estimation of   is the average of these three estimations, with       and 
      defined in §3.2: 
                                                                                           
With   available, we obtain an estimation of  from    and     by 
                                                                           
PROOF: In a deterministic model, the left-hand side equals   + P(  ) +   + P(   ) = 
2  + .   
We similarly obtain a second estimation from    and    , and from    and    . Our 
final estimation is, again, the average of these three estimations: 
                                                                                   
The ambiguity aversion index of Abdellaoui et al. (2011, Eq. 9), shown below to be 
equivalent to our b, is defined as 
                                                                              
It is a linear transform of the area below the fitting line   + p. Similarly, 
                                                                                   
is the index of a-insensitivity (Abdellaoui et al. Eq. 8). It is an anti-index of the 
steepness of the fitting line   + p, reflecting how sensitive the decision maker is to 
changes in (likelihoods of) events. 
We next express a  ´ and b  ´ directly in terms of the observed matching probabilities, 
showing that they are identical to our indices a and b. 
 
OBSERVATION A.1. a  ´= 1 + 3      3      = a;  b  ´= 1            = b. 
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PROOF. a  ´= 1   = 1            + 2  = 1             + 2      + 2       2      = 1 + 3      3      = 
a. 
b  ´= 1  2    = 1  2(     +          )  3      + 3      = 1             = b.  
Thus we immediately obtain plausible estimations of Abdellaoui et al.'s (2011) 
indices. Unlike Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, & Wakker (2015), 
we need not specify the subjective probabilities P, because they cancel anyhow, and 
we need not carry out data fitting. Therefore, the indexes can be used in applications, 
as explained in §3.2, without knowing the mathematics and parameters of the 
underlying theories in detail. 
We briefly note that Schmeidler’s (1989) model, under ambiguity aversion, predicts 
b > 0, in agreement with our interpretation of ambiguity aversion. It assumes 
expected utility for risk and, hence for each event E the nonadditive measure W(E) is 
equal to the matching probability m(E). Convexity of W, which in his model is 
equivalent to ambiguity aversion (or uncertainty aversion as he called it) implies that 
W(  ) + W(   ) < 1. 
The general index of ambiguity aversion (with    the complement to E) 
                                                                                   
was suggested by Schmeidler (1989 pp. 572, 574) in a particular example, and was 
suggested in general by Dow & Werlang (1992) and others (§3.2), always in models 
assuming expected utility for risk. Our index b is this index, averaged over {  ,    }, 
{  ,    }, and {  ,    }. 
 
OBSERVATION A.2. Our ambiguity aversion index b results from Eq. A.8. Under 
Schmeidler (1989), ambiguity aversion implies b > 0, ambiguity neutrality implies b = 
0, and ambiguity seeking implies b < 0.   
Many authors have used parts of Observation A.2, invariably assuming expected 
utility for risk, which implies that matching probabilities equate the nonadditive 
decision weighting functions. Interpreting a value 0 in Eq. A.8 as ambiguity neutrality 
of the decision maker, or nonambiguity of the event E, occurred in Ghirardato & 
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Marinacci (2002 Proposition 22), Ivanov (2011), and others. Interpreting a positive 
value as ambiguity aversion of the decision maker, or as ambiguity of the event 
(usually in approaches that focused on ambiguity aversion), occurred in Klibanoff, 
Marinacci, & Mukerji (2005 Definition 7) and many others. 
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Chapter 4  | Belief Updating under 
Ambiguity11 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Belief updating is at the heart of decision theory and statistical theory, and has 
been applied to economic theory and artificial intelligence. The traditional 
Bayesian updating approach assumes ambiguity neutral behavior, and provides a 
simple method to calculate posterior probabilities based on prior beliefs and 
received information. Its decision principles leads to expected utility (EU; de 
Finetti 1937, Savage 1954). However many empirical findings have 
demonstrated violations of the EU model. One of the biggest empirical problems 
for Bayesian updating is that it can only accommodate ambiguity neutral 
behavior due to the additivity of subjective probability. Neither ambiguity averse 
nor ambiguity seeking behavior can be accommodated. Much literature (Gilboa & 
Marinacci, 2013; Trautmann & Van de Kuilen 2015) has shown that a large 
proportion of people are ambiguity averse, with also considerable ambiguity 
seeking, showing the need to develop non-Bayesian approaches. Dempster (1967) 
and Shafer (1976) provided a famous non-Bayesian updating rule. They used 
non-additive measure of belief and weighting functions to represent perceived 
likelihood. Another rule was provided by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) 
The three aforementioned belief updating rules are the most popular ones in 
decision theory, where both Bayesian and non-Bayesian updating rules have 
their pros and cons. The Bayesian approach avoids the problem of arbitrage and 
is often regarded as a benchmark for rationality. The non-Bayesian approaches 
require that likelihoods of events are represented by weights rather than by 
subjective probabilities. These features enable non-Bayesian approaches to allow 
heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes. According to some authors, non-Bayesian 
approaches can be rational (Gilboa and Marinacci 2013, Schmeidler 1989). 
                                                             
11 Professor Peter P. Wakker made helpful comments and suggestions 
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This chapter studies belief updating under ambiguity. Using the framework of 
decision theory, we compare Bayesian with non-Bayesian updating in its model 
specification and the numerical implications. This chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 4.2 describes Gilboa’s (1987) and Schmeidler’s (1989) rank dependent 
utility for ambiguity, which agrees with cumulative prospect theory for gains 
under ambiguity (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and which is the framework we 
use to study belief updating. Section 4.3 presents different models for belief 
updating. A numerical analysis of the three updating approaches is in Section 4.4. 
Section 4.5 discusses the results and their implications. Section 4.6 concludes.  
.  
 
 
45 
 
4.2 Rank Depdendent Utility 
 
4.2.1 Definition 
Rank-dependent-utility (RDU; Gilboa 1987; Schmeidler 1989) is a model for 
decision under ambiguity and it is one of the most popular models to capture 
deviations from the classical expected utility model (Savage 1954). It can 
accommodate both ambiguity averse and ambiguity-seeking behavior. The 
model was first introduced by Quiggin (1982) for decision under risk (known 
probabilities). Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989) introduced it more 
generally for decision under uncertainty (unknown probabilities). This paper 
focuses on ambiguity and, hence, follows Schmeidler’s (1989) assumption of 
expected utility for risk. Thus, deviations from expected utility are generated by 
ambiguity. This is the prevailing assumption in studies of ambiguity in the 
modern literature, leading to the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model for ambiguity 
(Gilboa & Marinacci 2013). 
The basic idea of RDU is that decision makers use nonadditive weighting 
functions rather than subjective probabilities. They may therefore overweight or 
underweight some events relative to subjective probabilities. This paper uses 
RDU to analyze choices between prospects. In particular, RDU is used to calculate 
the certainty equivalent (CE) of a prospect, i.e. a guaranteed return that is 
indifferent to the prospect for a decision maker. 
We first introduce the general RDU model. Let S be a state space with its 
elements states (of nature) and events as its subsets. One state     is true, and 
the other states are not true. An event is true if it contains the true state. 
Consider a prospect  
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yielding outcome    when event    happens,       . The events        
partition the state space  . In this paper, outcomes are real numbers designating 
money. The prospect designates a state-contingent outcome, i.e., the outcome 
depends on which state of nature is true. However, a decision maker does not 
know for sure which state is the true one and cannot influence it.  
We next turn to defining the RDU functional. For this purpose, we assume that 
the prospect in Eq. (1) is rank-ordered:        . This can always be 
arranged by renumbering the events. For event   , the rank is defined as 
         , which is the union of the events of receiving an outcome ranked 
better than   . The prospect in Eq. (1) is evaluated by the following formula: 
   
 
   
                                                                              
  is the utility function and the     are decision weights. For simplicity, this paper 
assumes linear utility, i.e.,      , so as to focus on the novelty of ambiguity. 
The assumption of linear utility can alternatively be justified by the Anscombe-
Aumann (1963) approach where outcomes are lotteries. For adherence to 
conventions in finance and, again, for simplicity, this paper focus on monetary 
outcomes. Decision weights are nonnegative and sum to 1, and are defined later 
in terms of a weighting function. Under linear utility, the CE of a prospect is also 
the price the decision maker is willing to pay to receive the prospect, which is 
useful for applications in finance. 
By definition, a weighting function  maps events to [0,1] and satisfies the 
following three conditions:  
                                              . 
The decision weight    in Eq. (4.2) is defined as follows: 
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An implication is that the decision weight    of receiving outcome    depends 
both on the event    and on the rank. Such rank dependence can be used to 
model pessimism (overweighting bad outcomes), for instance, enhancing 
ambiguity aversion (Schmeidler 1989), which is the topic of the chapter.  
 
4.2.2 Special case of Rank Dependent Utility 
For many years it was generally thought that, because of Ellsberg’s (1961) 
paradox, subjective probabilities could not be used in any manner to analyze 
ambiguity.  Chew & Sagi (2008) demonstrated, surprisingly, that probabilities 
can still be used to analyze ambiguity, by generalizing an implicit assumption 
made up to that point: Chew and Sagi assumed that probabilities can be weighted 
differently for different kinds of events.  Under ambiguity aversion, probabilities 
of ambiguous events will be weighted more pessimistically than objective 
probabilities. Their approach implies that Machina & Schmeidler’s (1992) 
probabilistic sophistication does not hold globally, but it may still hold locally 
when restricted to subcollections of events, related to some suited sources of 
uncertainty.  This will be the case considered in this paper.  
Chew & Sagi’s discovery was the basis of the source method of Abdellaoui et al. 
(2011), and will be used in this paper. We describe it briefly, referring the reader 
to Abdellaoui et al. (2011) for full details. For our model, Chew & Sagi’s 
assumption amounts to the existence of a function  and a probability measure P 
such that 
                                                                           (4.4) 
where P satisfies additivity (Wakker 2010 Exercise 10.3.2). The function w    , 
carrying subjective probabilities to decision weights, is called the source function. 
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Intuitively,  reflects the deviation from Bayesian beliefs. We call the model in 
Eq. (4.4) CS-RDU. 
For simplicity, we use one of the most common forms of the  function, the 
power function, i.e.,       , to capture ambiguity aversion or seeking. When 
     the source function reduces to linear function and RDU reduces to SEU, i.e., 
ambiguity neutrality. When      the source function becomes convex, 
exhibiting a general underweighting of probabilities implying ambiguity aversion. 
When      the source function becomes concave, exhibiting a general 
overweighting of probabilities and ambiguity seeking. This paper will consider 
three different cases of   , specifically,          and 1.2. 
The source method is a restriction of Schmeidler’s (1989) RDU. It has been found 
that RDU is too general; i.e., there exist too many nonadditive weighting 
functions   whenever the state space is not very small. The source method has 
been shown to be a sufficiently tractable specification (Kothiyal, Spinu, & Wakker 
2014). 
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4.2.3 Two probability measures 
We consider three exhaustive and mutually exclusive events A, B and C. Say A 
designates a stock price going up by more than 0.4%, C designates the stock price 
going down by more than 0.6%, and B designates the event between these two. 
We assume that we can consider events A, B and C each day again, and in this 
respect they are timeless. To distinguish them from events formalized later that 
will be time specific, we call A, B and C generic events. 
This chapter assumes that a decision maker observes events at the end of the day 
and then updates her beliefs. Therefore, in day 0 (assumed as today), the 
decision maker does not observe any new events before the end of that day. Her 
belief then, during that day before its end, is based only on her prior beliefs. At 
the start of day 1, she has observed the event at the end of day 0, and her beliefs 
have been updated using the new information. Similarly, the decision maker 
observes new information at the end of day 1, and her beliefs in the last day that 
we consider, day 2, are updated based on the information she now has. For 
simplicity, we restrict the discussion of belief updating to two observations of 
new information. Three different approaches to update belief are discussed 
below.  
We use symbols       to denote general elements of        .  Further,    
denotes the generic event   realized in day 0,    the generic event   realized in 
day 1,    the generic event   realized in day 2, and so on. In each day, one of the 
generic events is realized, so that a state (of nature)     can be expressed 
by           , for instance. The state space   consists of all 27 such triples (3 
generic events per day, 3 days in total, i.e.,       states), which are displayed 
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below. An example of an event is:  
                                                  
                                                        
For P as in Eq. (4.4),       denotes the probability of the realization of generic 
event   in day 0. Similarly,          is the probability of the realization of generic 
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event   in day 0 and   in day 1, and             means the probability of the 
realization of generic event   in day 0,   in day 1, and   in day 2. 
This paper considers two probability measures and the probabilities in day 0 are 
                  
 
 
      and                                , 
respectively. Their extension to more general events, specifying what happens on 
day 1 and 2, is given in the following tables. This extension is based on an 
assumed Dirichlet process. This process is based on the beta family of 
probabilities and their multinomial extension (Wilks 1962), and is a widely used 
process model. Further explanations are in Appendix 4.1.   
Table 4.1: States of nature and their probabilities  
when                   
 
 
       
                                                      
                                                      
                                                      
                                                      
                                                      
                                                      
                                                      
                                                      
                                                      
 
 
Table 4.2: States of nature and their probabilities  
when                                 
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The probability of event can be calculated from the 27 states of nature, for 
example:                                             . In the Dirichlet 
process and, hence, also in Tables 1 and 2, the probabilities of two states of 
nature are the same if the total number of each generic event occurring is the 
same between the two states. For example,                               
as both state            and state            contain one time the generic event 
A and two times the generic event C. Therefore, the probabilities of two events 
are the same if the total number of each generic event occurring is the same 
between two events. For example,                  . Appendix 4.1 discusses 
this point in further detail.  
 
4.3 Models for belief updating 
 
This section discusses three different approaches to update a decision maker’s 
beliefs based on observed information.  A decision maker is assumed to update 
her preference in agreement with prior preference (Machina, 1989; Epstein and 
Le Breton, 1993). For each updating method, we first discuss a general 
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conditional weighting function  , and then turn to the special case of CS-RDU 
considered in this paper. All conditional weighting functions that we will 
consider are all of the following general form: 
        
      
    
                                                                
Here we have      ,  the     are decision weights, and we have             . 
This general form was defined by Sarin and Wakker (1998).  The particular 
decision weight    differs for the different methods, and will be explained for 
each case. The differences can be interpreted as different assumptions about the 
ranks of the events. 
 
4.3.1 Gilboa and Schmeidler’s updating approach 
 
Gilboa (1989a, 1989b) proposed the following rule to update belief  
        
      
    
                                                             
where      ,  is weighting function and         denotes the updated 
weighting function conditional on event G. This updating rule was shown to be 
plausible and was axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). It is referred to 
as Gilboa and Schmeidler (GS) updating. The underlying assumption in this rule is 
that the decision maker assumes that the event G, of which she has been 
informed, corresponds with the “best of all possible outcomes.” The 
corresponding rank-ordering of events is           . By applying this rank 
order in Eq. (4.5), we obtain 
        
      
    
 
      
    
        . 
This shows that the general conditional weighting function coincides with GS 
updating if a specific ranking of events is assumed.  
If we assume CS-RDU with the source function a power function, i.e.     
             , then G&S updating can be expressed by 
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The factor       appears both in the numerator and the denominator, and 
cancels. The updated weighting probability is the weighted updated probability. 
That is, as it so happens, weighting and updating are commutative. This is a 
feature typical of GS updating that does not hold in general, and that will for 
instance not hold for DS updating defined later. The conditional weighting 
function becomes a power function and its concavity depends on the power r. 
For GS updating, an increase in r results directly in a decrease in       . A 
small change in r has considerable impact on       , which the numerical 
analysis reported later will confirm.  
As appears from Eq. (4.7), the conditional weight is fully determined by the 
probabilities of events. As discussed at the end of section 4.2.3, probabilities of 
two events are the same if the total number of each generic event occurring is the 
same for the two events, e.g.,                  . Hence, if   concerns only day 
 , and   or   concerns only the preceding days,                if the total 
number of each generic event occurring in G and F is the same. In particular, the 
order of the observed generic events does not affect conditional weight. This is 
explained in detail in Appendix 4.2. 
Here are two examples to illustrate how the conditional weighting function and 
the CE of a prospect are calculated. The first example concerns day 0, with no 
updating involved. The second example concerns day 2 and does involve 
updating.  
EXAMPLE 4.1: We use the change of the AEX (Amsterdam Stock Exchange) index 
as the source of uncertainty. Let, for some day, A be the generic event that the 
AEX index increases by more than 0.4% that day. B is the generic event that the 
AEX index changes between 0.4% and -0.6%, and C is the generic event that the 
AEX index decreases by more than 0.6%, all on the day considered. Events A, B, 
and C are mutually exclusive and exhaustive: they partition the universal event. 
In each day, if a prospect yields outcome 130 for event A, 110 for event B, and 60 
for event C, then A is ranked better than B, which is ranked better than C. If this 
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prospect concerns day 0, then it can be denoted                      . We 
assume the prior beliefs in day 0 to be as in Table 2:                 
               . The power r in the weighting function is assumed to be 1.2 
and utility is linear, i.e.       for simplicity. At the start of day 0, no new 
information is available, and the weights of the three events and their unions are:  
            
             . 
                  
                    . 
Therefore, the CE of the prospect                       can be calculated 
according to its RDU value. Following Eq. (4.3), we have: 
                            
 
   
      
                                                            
                                      
       
The CE of the prospect is 110.8. In other words, a decision maker is willing to pay 
110.8 for this prospect. □  
 
Next we discuss the case of day 2 when the information about days 0 and 1 has 
been obtained.  
EXAMPLE 4.2: Assume that generic event B is realized in day 0 and generic event 
C in day 1. We use                       to denote the prospect considered in 
day 2. As in Example 1, we assume the probabilities of Table 2,      , and 
linear utility. We apply Eq. (4.7) to find the conditional weighting function12: 
                                                             
12 We assume updating in one stroke in day 2. One could also update in two steps, where the 
first one updates the weighting function on day 1 given the information received then, and then 
the second one updates this on day 2 given the extra information received then. For Bayesian 
updating and for GS updating as considered here, this alternative always gives the same result as 
 
 
55 
 
                        
   
          
        
         . 
                 
                     
        
         . 
Therefore, if the generic event B is realized in day 0 and C in day 1, then the CE of 
the prospect                         can be calculated according to its RDU 
value. Following Eq. (4.3), we have: 
                            
 
   
      
                                                           
                          
                                        
      
The CE of prospect                        is 95.3. In other words, a decision 
maker is willing to pay 95.3 for this prospect. It is natural that the CE has 
decreased relative to day 0, as the information received was unfavorable for the 
prospect considered. □  
 
4.3.2 Dempster and Shafer’s updating approach 
 
Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976) proposed another rule to update belief: 
        
                 
       
                                             
where      ,  is the weighting function and         denotes the updated 
weighting function conditional on G . This rule is referred to as Dempster-Shafer 
(DS) updating. The assumption underlying this rule is that the decision maker 
assumes that the event G, of which she has been informed, corresponds with the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
updating in one stroke. In general, however, such as for DS updating considered later, the two 
approaches can be different. For simplicity, we focus on updating in one stroke.  
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“worst of all possible outcomes.” The corresponding rank-ordering of events is 
          . By applying this rank order in Eq. (4.5), we obtain 
        
      
    
 
                 
       
        . 
This shows that the general conditional weighting function coincides with DS 
updating when a specific ranking of events is assumed.  
Similar to GS updating, if we assume CS-RDU and the source function as a power 
function, i.e.,                  , then the DS approach can be expressed 
by 
        
                 
       
 
              
 
       
        
       
Unlike GS updating, the final result cannot be reduced to a power function of a 
conditional probability. The factor       appears both in the numerator and the 
denominator and does not cancel. An increase in r results in a decrease in      , 
so that the denominator increases. However, the change in the numerator is not 
clear as both               
 
 and        decline. Therefore, how the power 
r affects the conditional weighting function        is not directly clear. We will 
discuss this point more in the numerical analysis. As in GS updating, the 
conditional weight is calculated from probabilities of events. Therefore, if   
concerns only day  , and   or   concerns only the preceding days,         
        if the total number of each generic event occurring in G and F is the 
same. In particular, again, the order of the observed generic events does not 
affect conditional weight. 
We again give an example to illustrate how the conditional weights and CE of a 
prospect are calculated. In day 0 when there is no updating, the weighting 
function is the same as in the GS approach. Hence the calculations here are 
identical to those in GS, and we refer to those. We next consider an example 
concerning day 2 that does involve updating. Here the DS approach differs from 
the GS approach. 
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EXAMPLE 4.3: Using the same assumptions about P, U, r as in Example 4.2, this 
example shows how to calculate the CE of the prospect                      . 
The conditional weighting functions are as follow: 
             
                     
   
 
          
   
              
     . 
                
                                
   
 
          
   
              
     . 
Therefore, if the generic event B is realized in day 0 and C in day 1, then the CE of 
the prospect                         can be calculated according to its RDU 
value. Following Eq. (4.3), we have: 
                            
 
   
      
                                                           
                          
                                        
     . 
The CE of the prospect                        is 99.2. In other words, a 
decision maker is willing to pay 99.2 for this prospect. Compared with GS 
updating, CE of the same prospect is higher in the DS approach. The unfavorable 
information received in days 0 and 1 has less impact under DS updating than 
under GS updating. This point will be confirmed in the numerical analysis given 
later. □  
 
4.3.3 Special case when     
 
In Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, we contrasted GS and DS updating under ambiguity 
aversion        . In the numerical analysis reported later, we consider both the 
ambiguity averse case         and the ambiguity seeking case        . This 
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section considers the case of ambiguity neutrality,      Then RDU becomes 
expected utility, which can only accommodate ambiguity neutral behavior. Then 
the GS and the DS updating rules coincide and are reduced to classical Bayesian 
updating:             . We denote the conditional weighting function of 
Bayesian updating as follows: 
                                                                                          
EXAMPLE 4.4: Using the same assumptions about     as in Example 1, but 
taking    , this example shows how to calculate the CE of the 
prospect                      . The unconditional weighting functions are as 
follows: 
                 . 
                       . 
Following Eq. (4.3), we have: 
                            
 
   
      
                                                             
                                        
       
The CE of the prospect                       is 113.5. Compared with GS 
updating, the CE of the same prospect is higher in the Bayesian approach, 
indicating a higher valuation of the prospect by the decision maker. This 
difference occurs because the decision maker here is ambiguity neutral rather 
than ambiguity averse. □  
 
EXAMPLE 4.5: Using the same assumptions about       as in Example 4.4 and 
assuming as in Example 4.2 that the generic event B is realized in day 0 and C in 
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day 1, this example shows how to calculate the CE of the prospect 
                     . The conditional weighting functions are as follow: 
                             . 
                                   . 
Therefore, if the generic event B is realized in day 0 and C in day 1, then the CE of 
the prospect                         can be calculated according to its RDU 
value (is expected value). Following Eq. (4.3), we have: 
                            
 
   
      
                                                           
                          
                                        
      
Compared with other updatings, the CE under Bayesian updating (99.3) is very 
close to the one in DS updating (99.2), and higher than the one under GS 
updating (95.3). □  
 
4.4 Numerical analysis 
 
This section uses numerical methods to compare the three updating rules. We 
consider the same source of uncertainty (change of AEX index) and the definition 
of generic events A, B and C as in Examples 4.1-4.5. We compare    ,       
and the CE of the prospect under the three updating rules. The reason that we 
only discuss two weights (    ,      ) is that rank A is better than rank B, 
which is better than rank C as the outcome is the highest for generic event A and 
the lowest for C. In order to calculate the CE of the prospect, we then only need 
these two weights to calculate all relevant decision weights (See Examples 4.1-
4.5).  
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We consider the outcome (130, 110, 60) corresponding to generic events A, B, 
and C. Hence the prospect is                      , where           . Besides 
Bayesian updating where the power r of the source function w is 1, this section 
discusses two cases with different power in the source function,       and 
     . The former case concerns concave weighting and ambiguity seeking, and 
the latter case assumes convex weighting and ambiguity aversion. Two 
probability measures have been provided in section 4.2.3, where the first 
measure (Table 4.1) assumes the prior probability in day 0 to be       
            
 
 
       and the second measure (Table 4.2) 
assumes                                . The former one assumes a 
symmetric distribution of the three generic events before new observations, 
where the latter one assumes the highest chance for A and the lowest chance for 
B. In the main context, we only discuss the second case. The first case is in 
Appendix 4.3 
 
4.4.1 Ambiguity averse source function (     ) 
 
We first discuss the case when       and the source function is convex. The 
table below (Table 4.3) summarizes the weights of   and     as well as CEs of 
the prospect                      , where           , when the prior 
probability is                                . The first column 
describes which updating rule is used. The weights and CEs are illustrated in 
column 2 for day 0, in column 3 to 5 for day 1, and in column 6 to 11 for day 2.  
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Table 4.3: Weights and CEs between day 0, day 1 and day 2 when                                and       
 Day 0 Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
GS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
DS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
Bayesian      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
GS         
       
 
    
       
       
 
    
       
       
 
    
       
       
 
    
          
       
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 DS         
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
        
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
        
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 Bayesian         
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 GS   
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
        
DS   
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
        
Bayesian   
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In day 0, no information is obtained, and therefore the weights and CEs are the same 
between GS and DS updating, because no updating took place. Whereas Bayesian 
updating with     involves ambiguity neutrality, for the other two approaches with 
     , the source function demonstrates ambiguity averse behavior. Then generic 
events with higher outcome are underweighted, so that the weights of   and     as 
well as CEs then are smaller than under Bayesian updating.  
In day 1, one observation is gained and belief is updated. There are three possibilities 
(        ) of the observation in day 0, and we choose one to discuss because the 
other two give similar findings. Assume that the generic event B is realized in day 0 
(See column 4). Then, the weights and CEs are higher under DS updating than under 
GS updating, and both are lower than under Bayesian updating. This reflects that GS 
updating induces more ambiguity aversion than DS updating. The difference between 
Bayesian and DS updating is much smaller than that between Bayesian and GS 
updating. For        ,  the difference is 0.006 (=0.400-0.394) between Bayesian 
and DS and 0.067 (=0.400-0.333) between Bayesian and GS. The latter difference is 
more than 10 times the former.  
Similarly, for           ,  the difference is 0.003 (=0.887-0.884) between 
Bayesian and DS and 0.021 (=0.887-0.866) between Bayesian and GS. Now the latter 
difference is around 7 times the former. This explains why the CE difference between 
Bayesian and DS updating (0.253 =112.333-112.080) is much smaller than that 
between Bayesian and GS updating (2.14 =112.080-109.940), where the latter one is 
around 8 times the former. As Bayesian updating can be viewed as GS or DS updating 
when    , such differences in weights and CEs between Bayesian and the other two 
approaches are the results of the change of power r from 1 to 1.2. As discussed in 
section 4.3.1, GS updating is more sensitive to the change of r and, hence, an increase 
in r (from 1 to 1.2) leads to a significant decrease in the decision weights of favorable 
events and CEs. As is discussed in section 4.3.2, the impact of   on DS updating is not 
clear from the model specification. This is confirmed by numerical results: DS 
updating is less sensitive to the change of r and, hence, the change of r has only a 
small effect on decision weights and CEs. These results also apply to the cases where 
other observations are obtained in day 0. 
 
 
63 
 
When we compare different cases in day 1, concerning different observations in day 0, 
we find that unfavorable information affects CEs of prospects differently between GS 
and DS updating. Compared with the case when favorable information is received, a 
decision maker’s CE of the prospect decreases more under GS updating than under DS 
updating when unfavorable information is received. For example, the difference in CE 
of the prospect                      between the condition of   in day 0 and the 
condition of   in day 0 is 25.807 (117.064-91.239) under GS updating and 22.916 
(118.264-95.348) under DS updating. This implies that unfavorable information leads 
to a bigger increase in ambiguity averse behavior under GS updating than under DS 
updating. 
We also find that the weights can be the same after observing different information 
under GS and Bayesian updating. For example, under Bayesian updating, 
                        and                             . In the 
first equation, neither of the two observations (   or   ) confirms the event (  ) to be 
weighted. In the second equation, both of the two observations (   or   ) confirm the 
event (     ) to be weighted. We find that the conditional weight is the same as 
long as the number of observations that confirm the event to be weighted is 
equivalent. There is an underlying reason. In Bayesian updating, the conditional 
weight is equal to the conditional probability, which is calculated according to 
Carnap’s rule as explained in Appendix 4.1. Disjoint causality is satisfied under 
Carnap’s rule, which means that the conditional probability of an event, say   , is only 
affected by the number of observations that gave that event  , and it is immaterial 
how often the remaining observations gave   or  . Therefore, given observations, the 
conditional weight of a specific event depends only on the number of observations 
that confirm the event to be weighted. In GS updating, the conditional weighting 
function is the source function w applied to the conditional probability and, hence, 
disjoint causality also holds for weights. However, this property does not hold for DS 
updating. For example, in day 1,               and              .  
In day 2, two observations are obtained and belief is updated. As discussed in section 
4.3, the order of the observed generic events does not affect conditional weight, so 
that CEs are also not affected. Hence there are 6 possibilities 
{                                               } of the observation in day 0 and 
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day 1. All the findings about updating in day 1 are confirmed for day 2: the weights 
and CEs are higher in DS updating than in GS updating, and both of these are lower 
than in Bayesian updating. The difference between Bayesian and DS is much smaller 
than that between Bayesian and GS.  
Unfavorable information makes a decision maker more ambiguity averse or 
pessimistic under GS updating than under DS updating. Disjoint causality for weights 
hold for Bayesian and GS updating, but not for DS updating.  
When comparing different days, we find that, apart from day 0, CEs are always higher 
in DS than in GS updating. Therefore, when new information is received, no matter 
whether good or bad, a decision maker always exhibits more ambiguity aversion 
under GS updating than under DS updating.  
 
4.4.2 Ambiguity seeking source function (     ) 
 
This section discusses the case when       and the source function is concave. The 
table below summarizes the weights of   and     as well as CEs of the 
prospect                      , where           . The prior probability is 
                                and      . The structure is the same as in 
Table 4.3.
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Table 4.4: Weights and CEs among day 0, day 1 and day 2 when                                and       
 Day 0 Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
GS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
DS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
Bayesian      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
GS         
       
 
    
       
       
 
    
       
       
 
    
       
       
 
    
          
       
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 DS         
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
        
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 Bayesian         
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
   
       
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 
    
          
       
 GS   
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
DS   
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
        
Bayesian   
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
        
 1 
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Many findings under ambiguity aversion are naturally reflected under ambiguity 
seeking. Now the weights and CEs in Bayesian updating are always smaller than 
under GS and DS updating. Apart from day 0, where no updating is involved, the 
weights and CEs in GS updating are larger than under DS updating. This reflects that 
GS updating now is in general more ambiguity seeking than DS updating.    
Compared with the case when favorable information is received, a decision maker’s 
CE of the prospect decreases less under GS updating than under DS updating when 
unfavorable information is received. For example, the difference in CE of the 
prospect                      between the condition of   in day 0 and the 
condition of   in day 0 is 20.266 (121.018-100.752) under GS updating and 23.73 
(119.716-95.986) under DS updating. This implies that unfavorable information leads 
to a smaller increase of ambiguity averse behavior under GS updating than under DS 
updating. 
For Table 4.4, as for Table 4.3, disjoint causality of weights hold for GS and Bayesian 
updating, but not for DS updating. The deviation in weights and CEs between DS and 
Bayesian updating is always smaller than that between GS and Bayesian updating. 
Among the three updating approaches, GS updating is affected most by the change of 
power   from 1.2 to 0.8. Both the weights and CEs in GS updating are the lowest when 
the source function is convex (     ) and the highest when the source function is 
concave (     ). This confirms the inference in section 4.3.1 that a small change in   
has a considerable impact on weights. The change in DS updating is less significant 
when   changes. Both the weights and CEs are slightly lower (higher) than Bayesian 
updating when       (0.8). Thus, GS updating accentuates deviations from 
ambiguity neutrality relative to DS updating. 
In the main text, we discussed three updating rules using the non-uniform probability 
measure of                                . We show in appendix 4.2 that 
the same results are found when another, uniform, probability measure       
            
 
 
       is implemented.  
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4.5 Discussion 
 
The numerical analysis describes how CEs and weights of the prospect changes when 
receiving new information under the three updating rules. Our findings can be 
applied in other domains, especially finance. If we take the market as the decision 
maker and prospects concern state-contingent assets. The CE of a prospect then is its 
market price, which depends on the market’s belief. If the market is ambiguity averse, 
then the price of the prospect is lower under GS updating than under DS updating. For 
an ambiguity seeking market, the price of the prospect is higher under GS updating 
than under DS updating. Prices under DS updating are relatively stable no matter 
what the market’s ambiguity attitude is, and they are always close to Bayesian 
updating. If we assume Bayesian updating to be a benchmark for rationality, then GS 
updating leads to more deviations from rationality than DS updating, and it is more 
sensitive to the ambiguity attitude of the market. A small change in ambiguity attitude 
of the market leads to a large change in price under GS updating no matter what its 
ambiguity attitude is.  
Although favorable (unfavorable) information has positive (negative) effect on price 
in all three approaches, there are differences between these effects. For an ambiguity 
averse market, favorable (unfavorable) information leads to the biggest rise 
(decrease) in price under GS updating. For an ambiguity seeking market, favorable 
(unfavorable) information leads to the smallest rise (decrease) in price under GS 
updating. Therefore, the price change to information is very sensitive to the 
ambiguity attitude of the market under GS updating.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses belief updating and its implications in financial pricing under 
different approaches. The Bayesian updating rule only allows for ambiguity neutral 
behavior while the GS and DS approaches are more flexible and can accommodate 
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both ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking behavior. The Bayesian approach is the 
special case of GS and DS approaches when ambiguity neutrality holds. A numerical 
analysis is provided to compare the three updating rules. Ambiguity attitudes affect 
not only static decisions, but also the way in which new information is incorporated. 
For an ambiguity averse (seeking) decision maker, GS updating leads to a lower 
(higher) CE of the prospect than DS updating, and favorable or unfavorable 
information has bigger (smaller) impact under GS updating than under DS updating.  
 
Appendix 4.1 
 
The probabilities in Table 4.1 and 4.2 are taken from conjugate parametric families, 
i.e., its members, after updating, turn into other members of that same parametric 
family.  In particular, the probabilities belong to the Dirichlet family, which is a 
multinomial extension of the beta family, a widely used conjugate family.   
      The calculation of the prior probability is as follows 
           =                             
where              , and the subscript refers to the day. The conditional 
probabilities are calculated as follows: 
            
         
   
  and           
         
   
 
where 
  is the parameter that represents the weight on one’s prior belief. 
   is the number of appearances of generic event   in the past 1 day (day 0). 
   is the number of appearances of generic event   in the past 2 days (day 0 and day 
1). 
      An intuitive understanding of the conditional probability is that the decision 
maker predicts future events based on her prior belief and the observation of new 
events.   represents the level of trust the decision maker gives to her prior belief. A 
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higher value of    indicates more trust and less attention for new observations. In the 
tables, I assume    . 
       The methods of calculation are special cases of Carnap’s induction (1952, 1980). 
Assume that      is the prior probability of observing a certain event E,   is a 
positive constant, N is the total number of observation and n is the number of 
observations giving event E. Then the conditional probability of event E after N 
observations, I denoted   , is a convex combination of the prior probability    and 
the observed relative frequency 
 
 
 with weights proportional to   and . We have, 
   
     
 
 
   
. 
       In Carnap’s approach, the order of appearance of generic events does not affect 
the conditional probability. This condition is called exchangeability (Wakker 2002). 
For instance, if     and    , the subjective probability is not affected by the day 
on which the decision maker observed the generic event.  
       Given   and , the conditional probability is only affected by n, the total number 
of observations giving event E, and not by which disjoint events happened in the 
other N-n cases. This condition is called disjoint causality (Wakker 2002). 
Exchangeability and disjoint causality explain why the probabilities of two states of 
nature (in Table 1 and Table 2) are the same if the total number of each generic event 
is the same. This condition and some other plausible conditions imply Carnap’s 
method (Carnap, 1952, 1980, Wakker, 2002). 
 
Appendix 4.2 
 
We know from Eq. (4.7) that        
       
     
 and        
       
     
. If the total 
number of each generic event occurring in   and   is the same, we have       
      as the probabilities of two events are the same if the total number of each 
generic event occurring is the same between two events. In addition, if  concerns 
only day  , and   or   concerns only the preceding days, then             
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   for the same reason. Therefore,        
       
     
 
       
     
         if these 
two conditions are satisfied. 
 
Appendix 4.3 
 
The two tables below summarize the weights of   and     as well as CEs of the 
prospect                      , where        , when the prior probability is 
                  
 
 
      . In Table 4.5,       and in Table 4.6,       
As appears from the tables, we have the same findings as in the main text.
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Table 4.5: Weights and CEs among day 0, day 1 and day 2 when                  
 
 
       and       
 Day 0 Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
GS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
DS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
Bayesian      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
GS         
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Table 4.6: Weights and CEs among day 0, day 1 and day 2 when                  
 
 
       and       
 Day 0 Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 1 (  ) Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
Day 2 
(     ) 
GS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
DS      
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
       
Bayesian      
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 GS   
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
        
DS   
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
        
  
        
Bayesian   
         
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
        
  
         
  
        
  
        
73 
 
Chapter 5  | Measuring Discounting without 
Measuring Utility 
 
 
Joint work with Arthur E. Attema, Han Bleichrodt, Yu Gao and Peter P. Wakker 
 
5.1 Introduction and Background 
 
Discounted utility is the most widely used model to analyze intertemporal decisions.  
It evaluates future outcomes by their utility weighted by a discount factor. Measuring 
discount factors is difficult because they interact with utility.  Most measurements 
simply assume that utility is linear,13 which is unsatisfactory for many economic 
applications. Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue (2002 p. 382), therefore, 
suggested to measure utility using risky choices while assuming expected utility, as in 
Chapman (1996), and then to use these utilities to measure discount factors. In the 
health domain, this method had been used before for flow (continuous) variables 
(Stiggelbout et al. 1994).  In economics, Andersen et al. (2008) and Takeuchi (2011) 
used this method for discrete outcomes.   
The aforementioned method has two limitations.  First, expected utility is often 
violated (Starmer 2000), which distorts utility measurements. Second, the transfer of 
risky cardinal utility to riskless intertemporal choice is controversial (Camerer 1995 
p. 619; Luce & Raiffa 1957 p. 32 Fallacy 3; Moscati 2013).  Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & 
L'Haridon (2013) and Andreoni & Sprenger (2012b) provided empirical evidence 
against such a transfer. When introducing discounted utility, Samuelson (1937 last 
paragraph) immediately warned that cardinal intertemporal utility may differ from 
other kinds of cardinal utility. To avoid these two difficulties, some studies elicited 
both utility and discounting from intertemporal choices (Abdellaoui, Attema, & 
Bleichrodt 2010; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & l'Haridon 2013; Andreoni & Sprenger 
                                                             
13 See Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue (2002 p. 381), Sutter et al. (2013), Tanaka, Camerer, 
& Nguyen (2010), and Warner & Pleeters (2001). 
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2012a, b; Epper & Fehr-Duda 2015). Such elicitations are complex and susceptible to 
collinearities between utility and discounting. 
This chapter presents a tractable method to measure discounting that requires no 
knowledge of utility. We adapt a recently introduced method for flow variables in 
health (Attema, Bleichrodt, & Wakker 2012) to discrete monetary outcomes in 
economics.  Flow variables, such as quality of life, are continuous in time and are 
consumed per time unit. Whereas theoretical economic studies sometimes take 
money as a flow variable, experimental studies of discounting invariably take it as 
discrete, received at discrete time points, and so will we do.  Because our method 
directly measures discounting, and utility plays no role, we call it the direct method 
(DM). 
The basic idea of the DM is as follows.  Assume that a decision maker is indifferent 
between: (a) an extra payment of $10 per week during weeks 1-30; and (b) that extra 
payment during weeks 31-65. Then the total discount weight of weeks 1-30 is equal 
to that of weeks 31-65. From such equalities we can derive the entire discount 
function. Knowledge of utility is not required because it drops from the equations.  
Even though this method is elementary, it has not been known before. 
The DM is easy to implement and subjects can easily understand it.  In an experiment, 
we compare it with a traditional, utility based, method (UM). For the UM we use the 
implementation by Epper, Fehr-Duda, & Bruhin (2011; EFB henceforth), which is 
based on prospect theory, currently the most accurate descriptive theory of risky 
choice.  We show that the DM needs fewer questions than the UM but gives similar 
results. 
 
5.2 Theory 
 
We assume a preference relation  over discrete outcome streams (x1,…,xT), yielding 
outcome (money amount) xj at time tj, for each j  T.  For ease of presentation, we 
consider the stimuli used in our experiment, where T = 52 and the unit of time is one 
 
 
75 
 
week.  Thus (x1,…,x52) yields xj at the end of week j, for each j.  Discounted utility holds 
if preferences maximize the discounted utility of outcome stream x: 
         
  
                                                                                        
Here, U is the subjective utility function, which is strictly increasing and satisfies U(0) 
= 0, and 0 < dj is the subjective discount factor of week j.  For E  {1,…,52}, E denotes 
the outcome stream that gives outcome  at all time points in E and outcome  at all 
other time points.  C(E) denotes the cumulative sum jEdj and reflects the total time 
weight of E.  C(k) denotes C({1,…,k}).  C is called the cumulative (discount) weight. The 
proof of the following result clarifies why we need not know utility: it drops from the 
equations. 
 
OBSERVATION 5.2.1.  Assume discounted utility, and  > . Then: 
                                                                                    
                                                                    )  
                                                                                
PROOF.  The preference and two inequalities in Eq. (5.2.2) are each equivalent to 
C(A)(U()U()) + C({1,…,52})U()   >  C(B)(U()U()) + C({1,…,52})U().  The 
other results follow from similar derivations.  □ 
 
Using Observation 5.2.1, we can derive equalities of sums of    , which, in turn, define 
the function C on {1,…,52} and all the    .  This procedure does not need any 
knowledge of utility and is therefore called the direct method (DM). 
In the mathematical analysis, we also consider a continuous extension of C, defined on 
all of (0,52], and also called the cumulative (discount) weight. At the timepoints 1, …, 
52 it agrees with C defined above. In the continuous extension, any payoff xj is a salary 
received during week j. Receiving a salary of xj per week during week j amounts to 
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receiving xj at time j. We equate j with (j1,j] here. Salary can also be received during 
part of a week. In the continuous extension, C(t)U() is the subjective value of 
receiving  during period (0,t], where C(t) = C(0,t] and t may be a noninteger, 0  t  T.  
Then C(t,52] = C(0,52]  C(0,t] also for nonintegers t. In all the empirical estimations 
reported later we extend C from integers to nonintegers using linear interpolations. 
Given the small time interval of a week, a piecewise linear approximation is 
satisfactory. The following remark shows that the     serve as discretized 
approximations of the derivative of C. 
 
REMARK 5.2.  d(j) = C(j)  C(j1) is the average of the derivative C  ´over the interval 
(j1,j].  Thus, dj is approximately C (´t) at t = j. □ 
 
5.3 Measuring  Discounting Using the Direct Method 
 
We now explain how C can be measured up to any degree of precision using the DM.   
Of course, C(0) = 0.  Normalization of C can be chosen freely because it does not affect 
preference.  We choose C(52) = d1 + ... + d52 = 1.  We write cp = C
1(p).  Then      and 
     . We take any  > 0 and measure c½  such that (0,c½ ]0 ~ (c½ ,52]0. By 
Observation 5.1, C((0,c½ ]) = C((c½ ,52]) = ½ . Once we know c½  we can measure c¼  
and c¾  by eliciting indifferences (0,c¼ ]0 ~ (c¼ ,c½ ]0 and (c½ ,c¾ ]0 ~ (c¾ ,52]0.  It follows 
that C(c¼ ) = ¼  and C(c¾ ) = ¾ .  In general, we measure subjective midpoints s of time 
intervals (q,t] by eliciting indifferences (q,s] ~ (s,t] ( > ).  By doing this 
repeatedly, we can measure the cumulative function C to any desired degree of 
precision.  We can, then, derive the discount factors from C. 
The DM assumes discounted utility.  Its most critical property is separability: a 
preference (x1,…,x52)  (y1,…,y52) with a common outcome xi = yi = c is not affected if 
this common outcome is replaced by another common outcome xi = yi = c .´  By 
repeated application, preference is independent of any number of common outcomes. 
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The next proposition shows that the DM permits a simple test of separability, which 
we implemented in our experiment.  The proposition holds for any outcome  > 0 and, 
more generally, for any pair of outcomes  >  with  instead of 0.  The proof is in the 
appendix. 
PROPOSITION 5.3.1.  Under weak ordering and separability, we must have: 
(i) (c¼ ,c½ ]0 ~ (c½ ,c¾ ]0; 
(ii) (0,c¼ ]0 ~ (c¾ ,52]0.  □ 
 
5.4 The Traditional Utility-based Method (UM) 
 
Our experiment compared the DM with a traditional utility(based) method (UM), 
replicating the implementation by EFB.  We first measured prospect theory’s utility 
function from elicited certainty equivalents of 20 risky options (see Table 5.5.1).  Next, 
we measured the money amount  such that 
                                                                                         
where j0 stands for receiving  at time (week) j and 0 at all other times.  Unlike the 
DM, the UM only involves one-time payments. We chose 9030 (and avoided time 0) to 
have stimuli similar to those of the DM. Using the measured utility function U and Eq. 
5.2.1 (discounted utility), we derive from Eq. 5.4.1: 
  
 
  
   
     
    
                                                                            
Here   
  is the discrete utility based discount factor of week j. Normalization can be 
chosen freely, and we usually normalized   
 
 = 1. 
 
5.5 Experiment 
 
Subjects: 
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We recruited 104 students (61% male; median age 21) from Erasmus University 
Rotterdam online, mostly economics or finance bachelors.  The experiment was run at 
the EconLab of Erasmus School of Economics. The data were collected in five sessions. 
Seven subjects gave erratic answers14 and their data were excluded from the analyses. 
 
Incentives: 
Each subject was paid a €5 participation fee right after the experiment. In addition, 
we randomly selected (by bingo machine) one subject in each session and then one of 
his choice to be played out for real. The selections were made in public. We 
transferred the amount won to the subject’s bank account at the dates specified in the 
outcome streams.  In the DM, subjects made choices between streams of money. 
Consequently, if one of the DM questions was played out for real, we made bank 
transfers during several weeks. The five subjects who played for real earned €290 on 
average. Over the whole group, the average payment per subject was €18.70. 
 
Procedure: 
The experiment was computerized. Subjects sat in cubicles to avoid interactions.  
They could ask questions at any time during the experiment. The experiment took 45 
minutes on average. 
The first part of the experiment consisted of the DM questions, and the second and 
third part consisted of the UM questions. Subjects could only start each part when 
they had correctly answered two comprehension questions. Training questions 
familiarized subjects with the stimuli. Within the DM and the UM parts, the order of 
the questions was counterbalanced. 
 
Stimuli: Part 1 
                                                             
14 Debriefings revealed that at least two of these subjects ignored all future payoffs because they 
had no bank account. 
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Part 1 consisted of five questions to measure discounting using the DM and two 
questions to test separability. To measure discounting, we elicited c½ , c¼ , c¾ , c⅛, and 
c⅞ from the following indifferences: 
(0,c½ ]0 ~ (c½ ,52]0, (0,c¼ ]0 ~ (c¼ ,c½ ]0, (c½ ,c¾ ]0 ~ (c¾ ,52]0, (0,c⅛]0 ~ (c⅛,c¼ ]0,  
and (c¾ ,c⅞]0 ~ (c⅞,52]0. (5.5.1) 
To test separability, we measured the indifferences in Proposition 5.3.1. 
Each question was presented as a choice list in which subjects chose between two 
options, A and B, in each row. Figure 5.5.1 displays a screen that subjects faced.  In the 
first choice (first row), B dominates A. Moving down the list, A becomes more 
attractive and in the final choice A dominates B. The computer enforced monotonicity: 
After a choice A [B], the computer automatically selected A [B] for all rows below 
[above], A [B] being more attractive there. Thus, there was a unique switch from B to 
A between two values. We took the indifference value as the midpoint between those 
two values. In Figure 5.5.1, which measures c⅛ for c¼  = 13, the subject switched 
between 5 and 6 weeks and the indifference value therefore was 5.5. 
We only used integer-week periods as stimuli to keep the choices simple. Hence, we 
could not always use the indifference values in subsequent questions and we had to 
make rounding assumptions.We rounded values below 26 weeks upwards (e.g., 5.5 to 
6 weeks), and values above downwards (e.g., 35.5 to 35 weeks) in subsequent choices.  
The appendix and web appendix give details of our rounding and analyses. With one 
exception, mentioned later, our conclusions remained the same under different 
rounding rules. 
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FIGURE 5.5.1. Choice list for the DM elicitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After each choice list, we asked a control question (explained in Web Appendix WA3).   
 
Stimuli: Part 2 
Part 2 consisted of seven questions of the type A = 9030 ~ j0 = B with weeks j = 4, 12, 
20, 28, 36, 44, and 52. Following EFB, we kept the early outcome in Option A constant 
and varied the gain  in Option B (Figure 5.5.2). As in part 1, the computer enforced 
monotonicity. EFB only used the time points 1 day, 2 months + 1 day, and 4 months + 
1 day. We changed those to obtain more detailed measurements and to facilitate 
comparison with our DM measurements. 
 
Stimuli: Part 3 
We elicited the certainty equivalents (CE) of twenty risky prospects, shown in Table 
5.5.1, to measure prospect theory’s utility function. The CE choice lists appeared in 
random order. They consisted of choices between sure amounts (option B) and risky 
prospects (option A) yielding x1 with probability p and x2 < x1 otherwise. We used a 
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choice list in which the sure amount that B offered decreased from x1 in the first row 
to x2 in the final row. We used the prospects in EFB with all amounts multiplied by 10 
and we used Euros instead of Swiss Francs. Figure 5.5.3 gives an example of one of 
the choice lists. 
 
FIGURE 5.5.2. Choice list for the UM elicitation 
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TABLE 5.5.1. Risky prospects 
                      
0.10 200 100 0.25 500 200 
0.50 200 100 0.50 500 200 
0.90 200 100 0.75 500 200 
0.05 400 100 0.95 500 200 
0.25 400 100 0.05 1500 500 
0.50 400 100 0.50 100 0 
0.75 400 100 0.50 200 0 
0.95 400 100 0.05 400 0 
0.05 500 200 0.95 500 0 
0.10 1500 0 0.25 400 0 
 
FIGURE 5.5.3. Choice list of prospects for the CE elicitation 
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5.6 Results 
Because normality of distributions was always rejected, we used Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests throughout 
5.6.1 Results for the DM 
In all tests reported below p  0.001 except when noted. The DM elicits subjective 
midpoints of time intervals (q,t], denoted s(q,t]. Table 5.6.1 shows that s(q,t] was 
always closer to q than to t, which is consistent with impatience. Figure 5.6.1 shows 
that the cumulative C function was concave, also indicating impatience. We can derive 
the discount factors dj = C(j)  C(j1) from C. They are in Figure 5.6.2, where they will 
be compared with the UM discount factors. 
TABLE 5.6.1. Descriptive statistics of the direct method 
variable mean sd min 
media
n 
max N 
c⅛ 5.55 1.25 2.13 6.13 9.13 97 
c¼  11.47 1.91 4.25 12.25 15.25 97 
c½  24.47 2.72 14.50 25.50 29.50 97 
c¾  37.77 2.22 27.75 38.75 42.75 97 
c⅞ 44.5 1.45 39.88 44.88 47.88 97 
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FIGURE 5.6.1.  C function of mean data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistical tests confirmed the above observations.  In all tests, we could reject the 
one-sided null of no or negative impatience (s(q,t] 
   
 
)  in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis of impatience (s(q,t] <
   
 
) 15.  
Decreasing impatience, found in many studies, implies that s(0,c½ ]  c¼  > (c½ ,1]  c¾  
and s(0,c¼ ]  c⅛ > s(c¾ ,1]  c⅞.  The evidence on decreasing impatience was mixed 
and depended on the rounding assumption used (see the web appendix). Under one 
rounding assumption, we found decreasing impatience in the comparison between 
(0,c½ ] and (c½ ,52] and increasing impatience in the comparison between (0,c¼ ] and 
(c¾ ,52]. Under another rounding assumption,16 the null of constant impatience could 
not be rejected. For all other tests in this paper, the rounding assumptions were 
immaterial. 
                                                             
15 c½  < 26, c¼  < c½ /2, c½  < (c¼  + c¾ )/2 (marginally significant), c¾  < (c½  + 52)/2, c⅛ < c¼ /2, and c⅞ < 
(52 + c¾ )/2. 
16 A large middle group (n=37) gave answers as close as possible to constant discounting.  The first 
rounding takes them as slightly impatient. It can also be argued that the null of constant discounting 
should be accepted for them (our second rounding). 
c½  c¼  c¾  c⅛ c⅞ 26 
13 
39 
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To test separability condition (i) in Proposition 5.3.1, we directly measured the 
subjective midpoint s½  of (c¼ , c¾ ]. That is, (c¼ ,s½ ]0 ~ ( s½ ,c¾ ]0. By condition (i), s½  
should equal c½ . To test separability condition (ii) in Proposition 5.3.1, we directly 
measured the value s¾  such that (0, c¼ ]0 ~ (s¾ 52]0. By Condition (ii), s¾  should equal 
c¾ . 
Separability was rejected in the first test (p < 0.01 two-sided), but not in the second.   
Even in the first test, we found few violations of separability at the individual level.  
For 54 out of 97 subjects separability was satisfied exactly. Moreover, for 80 subjects 
s½  and c½  differed by at most 1. For 13 subjects they differed by 2 or 3, and for 3 
subjects by 4 or more (1 subject missing). In the second test, separability could not 
hold exactly due to rounding, but 55 subjects had the minimal difference of 0.5, and 
for 76 subjects the difference was 1.5 or less. For 17 subjects it was 2.5 or 3.5, and for 
3 subjects it was 4.5 or more (1 missing). 
5.6.2 Results for the UM 
Table 5.6.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the discount factors   
  under the 
normalization   
   , the discount factor of the shortest delay in the UM. Comparing 
pairs of consecutive discount factors confirmed impatience (always p < 0.001). We 
could derive the cumulative function          
  
    from the discount factors. We 
here normalized         . 
 
TABLE 5.6.2. Descriptive statistics of the utility-based method (UM) 
variable mean sd min median Max N17 
  
  0.93 0.07 0.67 0.96 1 96 
   
  0.87 0.12 0.44 0.92 1 96 
   
  0.85 0.14 0.33 0.89 1 96 
   
  0.79 0.17 0.33 0.83 1 96 
   
  0.77 0.18 0.33 0.81 1 96 
                                                             
17 We excluded one subject because of his extreme power (118.7; overall average is 0.53) for 
utility. 
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  0.75 0.20 0.26 0.78 1 96 
   
  0.73 0.21 0.26 0.76 1 96 
 
5.6.3 Comparing discounting and impatience under the DM and the UM 
Figure 5.6.2 shows the discount factors of the DM and the UM. For easy comparison, 
we normalized both to 1 at week 3 here. Both discount factors were decreasing, 
confirming impatience. The DM discount factors slightly exceeded the UM discount 
factors, but not significantly (tests provided later). According to both methods, the 
annual discount rate was 35%, assuming continuous compounding      with t in 
years. 
Figure 5.6.3 shows the cumulative functions of the DM and the UM, using linear 
interpolation to obtain general values   
  from the seven measured   
   . We measure 
impatience (= concavity) for each cumulative function by the difference beween the 
area under this function and that under the diagonal (      ). For convex 
functions this index is negative. It is 0 if the decision maker does not discount. 
The average value of the impatience index was 1.14 for the DM and 1.62 for the UM.  
Both indices exceded 0 (p < 0.001), in agreement with impatience. The index for the 
UM exceeded that for the DM (p = 0.02), suggesting more impatience under the UM. 
 
FIGURE 5.6.2.  Comparing discount factors of the DM and the UM 
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FIGURE 5.6.3.  Comparing cumulative discount weights of the DM and the UM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We also estimated the DM and UM curves in Figure 5.6.3 by a power function.  The 
median powers were 0.96 for the DM and 0.93 for the UM.  Both powers were below 1 
(both p < 0.001), again confirming impatience, but they did not differ significantly 
from each other. The three measures of impatience (discount factors for week 52, 
area-differences, and estimated power coefficients) correlated strongly ( 0.90), for 
both the DM and the UM. For consistency between the two methods at the individual 
level, we tested correlations of the three measures of impatience between the DM and 
UM.  They were all around 0.25 (p < 0.001). Hence, even though the different 
measures led to consistent conclusions within methods, differences remained. 
 
5.6.4 Parametric estimations 
The discount factors trace out the discount function D(t) without making parametric 
assumptions (see Figure 5.6.2). This section reports parametric fittings. We estimated 
the discount function of each subject by maximum likelihood using the following 
three parametric families. 
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(1) Constant discounting (Samuelson 1937), with one parameter r  0: 
 D(t) = ert with r  0. 
(2) Hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), with two parameters   0 
and  > 0: 
 For  > 0: D(t) = (1 + t)/; 
  for  = 0: D(t) = et. 
The parameter determines how much the discount function departs from constant 
discounting. The limiting case  = 0 reflects constant discounting. The  parameter 
determines impatience. 
(3) Unit-invariance discounting18, with two parameters r > 0 and d: 
For d > 1, D(t) = exp(rt1-d) (only if t = 0 is not considered); 
for d = 1, D(t) = tr (only if t = 0 is not considered); 
for d < 1, D(t) = exp(rt1-d). 
The r-parameter determines impatience, and the d-parameter departure from 
constant discounting, interpreted as sensitivity to time by Ebert & Prelec (2007).  The 
common empirical finding is d  1, reflecting insensitivity; d > 1 reflects 
oversensitivity.  
Hyperbolic discounting can only account for decreasing impatience. However, 
empirical studies have observed that a substantial proportion of subjects are not 
decreasingly, but increasingly impatient (references in §5.6.5). Unit-invariance 
discounting can account for both decreasing and increasing impatience. We can use 
the entire unit invariance family because our domain does not contain t = 0 (explained 
in the discussion section). The exclusion of t = 0 also implies that the popular quasi-
hyperbolic family coincides with constant discounting for our stimuli. 
 
                                                             
18  Read (2001 Eq. 16) first suggested this family.  Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker (2009) call it 
constant relative decreasing impatience, and Ebert & Prelec (2007) call it constant sensitivity.  
Bleichrodt et al. (2013) proposed the term unit invariance. 
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TABLE 5.6.3. Results of parametric fittings for the DM and the UM 
 exponential   hyperbolic       unit invariance 
 Mean(r) Median(r) Mean(α,β) Median(α, β) Mean(d,r) Median(d,r) 
Par. UM
DM 
0.009 0.006 1.88, 0.25 1.21, 0.06 0.58, 2.19 0.94, 0.69 
0.005 0.002 1.66, 0.14 1.30, 0.05 0.80, 1.86 0.89, 0.25 
AIC UM         
DM 
3.03 3.26 1.55 1.68 1.63 1.70 
3.56 3.68 1.66 1.80 1.65 1.78 
 
Table 5.6.3 shows the estimated parameters. The exponential discounting parameters 
differed between the UM and the DM (always p < 0.001), reflecting more discounting 
for the UM. The parameters of hyperbolic discounting and unit invariance discounting 
did not differ significantly (p > 0.2). 
The final two rows of Table 5.6.3 show the goodness of fit of the three discount 
families by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). More negative values indicate 
better fit. The best fit was obtained by the DM method with exponential discounting. 
Compared with the UM, the DM fitted better for exponential discounting (p < 0.001). 
The DM also seemed to fit better for unit invariance and hyperbolic discounting, but 
the differences were not significant. Of the three parametric families, exponential 
discounting fitted best for both the DM and the UM (both p < 0.001). For the UM, 
hyperbolic discounting gave the worst fit (p < 0.001). For the DM we found no 
significant difference between unit invariance and hyperbolic discounting (p = 0.22). 
In the absence of the immediacy effect, exponential discounting performed well, 
which also supports quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The web appendix gives further 
details. 
We, finally, investigated the relation between impatience (concavity of C and   ) and 
risk attitudes, controlling for demographic variables (age, gender, and foreign versus 
domestic—Dutch). Impatience under the UM was negatively related with concavity of 
utility, which is not surprising because the UM measurements were based on utility. 
Under the DM, impatience was not related with utility, suggesting that these are 
independent components. Impatience under the UM was also negatively related with 
risk aversion in the form of pessimism of probability weighting, whereas impatience 
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under the DM again was not. Age was positively related with UM impatience. Other 
relations were not significant.  Details are in the web appendix. 
 
5.6.5 Discussion of the results 
The DM and the UM led to similar conclusions. Under both methods, subjects were 
impatient. However, we found less discounting with the DM. Given the high estimated 
annual discount rate (35%), we consider this to be a desirable feature of the DM. 
Even though theoretical studies commonly assume universal decreasing impatience , 
many empirical studies have found considerable increasing impatience at the 
individual level.19 We found prevailing decreasing impatience in the UM, but mixed 
evidence in the DM. Statistical tests only showed weak evidence for decreasing 
impatience and Figure 5.6.2 suggests that impatience was not always decreasing. 
Increasing impatience implies that people become more reluctant to wait as time 
passes by. Substantial increasing impatience also explains the poor performance of 
the hyperbolic discount functions, which only allow for universal decreasing 
impatience, and cannot fit the data of increasingly impatient subjects. 
Our measurement of the DM included two tests of separability. One test suggested 
violations of separability, but we could not reject separability in the other test and 
most subjects behaved in agreement with it. No decision model fits data perfectly, and 
we still use such decision models in the absence of better models that are sufficiently 
tractable. Violations of separability may, for example, be due to sequencing effects 
and habit formation (Dolan & Kahneman 2008 p. 228; Loewenstein & Prelec 1991 p. 
350). The DM permits easy tests of separability that help to assess its restrictiveness.  
Because separability is used in virtually all applications of discount measurements, 
such tests are desirable. 
Besides separability, our analysis also assumes independence of discounting from the 
outcome used. This condition is sometimes called separability of money and time, and 
its violation the magnitude effect (Loewenstein & Prelec 1992). If magnitude effects 
                                                             
19 For a review see Attema et al. (2010 p. 2026).  Recent studies include Andreoni & Sprenger 
(2012), Burger, Charness, & Lynham (2011), and Takeuchi (2011).   
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exist, then our measurements are only valid for outcomes close to those used in the 
measurements. 
Attema et al. (2010) measured discounting up to a power without the need to know 
utility, but needed separate measurements to identify the power. Unlike the DM but 
like the UM, their measurements did not need time separability but they could not 
test it either. In a mathematical sense, our method is similar to the measurement of 
subjective probability based on equal likelihood assessments, where utility also drops 
from the equations and separability (now over events) is assumed (Baillon 2008). 
For the UM, we used the method of EFB. Our estimates of risk attitudes were close to 
theirs except for the curvature of utility, which we discuss in the Appendix. We could 
not directly compare our findings on discounting with those of EFB, because they 
used fewer and different time points. The negative relation between concave utility 
and impatience that we found for the UM is not surprising because utility plays a 
central role in the UM. Concave utility increases the ratio in Eq. 5.4.2 and thus 
decreases impatience. The negative relation between impatience and probability 
weighting suggests that this component of risk attitude also affects the UM 
measurements. Our findings suggests that there is collinearity between utility/risk 
attitude and discounting in the UM but not in the DM. 
Several authors conjectured that discounting may be due to the inherent uncertainty 
about the future. Halevy (2008) gave a theoretical foundation (that also assumes time 
separability), and the correlations between risk and time attitudes of Epper et al. 
(2011) support this conjecture. However, our finding that, when measured without 
risk involved, time attitudes were not related to risk attitudes suggests that time 
attitude entails a component separate from risk attitude. It is interesting to 
investigate whether other riskless methods to measure discounting, such as Attema 
et al.’s (2010), are related to risk attitudes. 
Our implementation of the DM is adaptive, with answers to questions influencing the 
stimuli in later questions. Theoretically, this may offer scope for manipulation: 
responding untruthfully to some questions may improve later stimuli. However, 
according to Bardsley et al.’s (2010 p. 265) classification, this possibility is only 
theoretical and is no cause for concern in our experiment. First, it was virtually 
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impossible for subjects to realize that questions were adaptive because of roundings 
used. Second, we expect that even readers who, like us, know the adaptive nature and 
even the stimuli of our experiment beforehand, will not see a way in which the loss of 
wrongly answering one question could be compensated by advantages in follow-up 
questions. For our subjects this would be impossible. Web appendix WE gives details.  
For these two reasons, manipulation is only a theoretical concern for our experiment. 
The DM can be implemented nonadaptively. For example, we can select a number of 
options      and timepoints  
  beforehand, and measure the timepoints    such that 
               for all j.  Observation 5.2.1 still gives equalities    
           . We can 
use these in parametric fittings of C or in tests of properties such as decreasing 
impatience, still without requiring knowledge about U. A drawback of this 
nonadaptive procedure is that we then cannot readily draw a connected C-curve as in 
Figures 5.6.1 and 5.6.3, where we needed no parametric assumption (other than 
linear interpolation).  
The DM always fitted better than the UM, and exponential discounting always fitted 
best, with unit invariance second best. Exponential discounting could perform well 
because we did not include the present t = 0 in our stimuli, where most violations are 
found due to the immediacy effect (Attema 2012). Although this effect is important 
and deserves further study, we decided to focus our first implementation of the DM 
on a better understood empirical domain, which we could compare directly with EFB.  
In this regard, we follow many other studies in the literature that use front-end 
delays.  
The DM can readily investigate the immediacy effect and discrete outcomes at t = 0.  
The latter are then interpreted as salaries paid at the beginning, instead of at the end 
of periods (weeks in our case). Given that the relations that we made with flow 
variables only served as intermediate tool in our mathematical analysis, and played 
no role in the stimuli or results, we can use the interpretation mentioned. Quasi-
hyperbolic discounting then implies a high weight for the first week of salary (now 
mathematically representing the present rather than the timepoint one week ahead), 
and moderate weights for the other weeks. 
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In experimental measurements of discounting of money, subjects may use market 
discounting of income rather than their subjective discounting of consumption. Cubitt 
& Read (2007) discuss this problem in detail, suggesting that it is often not very 
serious, and Reuben, Sapienza, & Zingales (2010) confirm so empirically. We 
conjecture that a stream of small extra payments on future occasions is more likely to 
be perceived as extra consumptions than as one big sum received at some future 
timepoint, but leave this as a topic for future research. At any rate, the DM gives a new 
tool to study and handle this issue. 
Subjective midpoints, used by the DM to measure discounting, have a long tradition in 
psychophysics (bisection; Stevens 1936) and mathematics (quasi-arithmetic mean; 
Aczél 1966). Condition (i) in Proposition 5.3.1, a necessary condition of a quasi-
arithmetic mean, is a special case of autodistributivity (Aczél (1966 Eq. 6.4.2.3, for t 
the midpoint of x and y). 
 
5.7 General discussion 
 
To our best knowledge, all experimental measurements of money discounting have 
used discrete outcomes.  Real-life decisions often involve flow outcomes that are 
repeated per time unit. Examples are salary payments, pension saving plans, and 
mortgage debt repayments. In such contexts, the DM is more natural than discrete 
methods such as the UM. For discrete outcomes, the DM can be an alternative to the 
UM if the payments are sufficiently frequent and the periods are sufficiently fine, as in 
our experiment. For single-outcome decisions or decisions in which outcomes occur 
infrequently, the DM is less useful. 
In the DM, subjects only make tradeoffs between periods. In the UM, subjects make 
tradeoffs both between outcomes and between periods, which is more complex. 
Hence, the DM is easier for subjects. Our experiment gave indirect support: We found 
a positive correlation between utility curvature and discounting for the UM, but not 
for the DM, showing that outcome tradeoffs impact time tradeoffs in the UM but not in 
the DM. 
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The DM is also easier to use for researchers, because of the elementary nature of 
Observation 5.2.1. In the DM, we only used seven questions. In the UM, we also used 
seven questions20 to elicit discounting, but we needed additional questions to elicit 
utility. The DM took much less time. 
The DM can be analyzed using parametric econometric fittings (§5.6.4), as can all 
existing methods, but, unlike most methods, the DM can also be analyzed in a 
parameter-free way (§5.6.1). This reveals the correct discount function without a 
commitment to a parametric family of discount functions. The DM can also be used 
for interactive prescriptive measurements in consultancy applications (Keeney & 
Raiffa 1976). 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
This paper has introduced a new method to measure the discounting of money, the 
direct method.  This method is simpler than existing methods because it does not 
need information about utility. Consequently, the experimental tasks are easier for 
subjects, researchers have to ask fewer questions, and the measurements are not 
distorted by biases in utility.  An experiment confirms the implementability and 
validity of the direct method. 
 
Appendix 5.1 Proofs 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.3.1.  This proof is elementary in not using technical 
assumptions such as continuity. The proof only uses the two outcomes used in the 
preferences, being  and 0.  For deriving the first indifference, we denote outcome 
streams as quadruples (x1,x2,x3,x4), with x1 received in (0,c¼ ], x2 in (c¼ ,c½ ], x3 in 
(c½ ,c¾ ], and x4 in (c¾ ,52].  We only use the following parts of Eq. 5.5.1: (,,0,0) ~ 
(0,0,,) (1), (,0,0,0) ~ 0,,0,0) (2), and (0,0,,0) ~ (0,0,0,) (3).  Assume, for 
                                                             
20 We used the same numbers of questions to make the methods comparable.  In fact, two DM 
questions tested separability.  The DM derived the discount functions from only five measurements. 
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contradiction, that (i) is violated, say (0,,0,0)  (0,0,,0) (4).  This, (2), (3), and 
transitivity, imply (,0,0,0)  (0,0,0,) (5).  By separability, (4) implies (,,0,0)  
(,0,,0), and (5) implies (,0,,0)  (0,0,,).  By transitivity, (,,0,0)  (0,0,,), 
contradicting (1).  Reversing all preferences shows that (0,,0,0)  (0,0,,0) implies 
the contradictory (,,0,0)  (0,0,,).  The indifference in (i) has been proved.  The 
second indifference follows from the first, (2), (3), and transitivity.  □ 
 
 
Appendix 5.2 Details of the DM method 
 
Preferences {1,…,j}0  {j+1,…,52}0 and {1,…,j+1}0  {j+2,…,52}0 reveal that c½  is in the 
interval (j, j+1).  We then estimate c½  = j+½ .  For the DM, we used the following 
roundings to derive the discount factors from the C function (Figure 5.6.2).  For each 
of the six periods considered (bounded by t = 0, the five cp values that we measured, 
and t = 52), we divided the increase of C over this period by the length of the period to 
obtain the average week-weight d over this period.  This d value we assigned to the 
midpoint of the period.  Between these midpoints we used linear interpolation.  We 
normalized (setting d = 1) at the smallest positive time point considered, being c1/8/2. 
Its average (2.75) was approximately 3, leading to about the same normalization as 
with the UM.  Thus we obtained a d-function over the interval (3, 48.25], with 48.25 
the average midpoint of the last interval (c⅞,52]. 
Because we only presented integer-week periods to subjects, and estimates of cp 
usually were nonintegers, we could not present exact cp values to our subjects in our 
adaptive experiment.  For example, to find the subjective midpoint c¼  of (0, c½ ], we 
rounded c½  and took the smallest larger integer, denoted j+1 here, and then found the 
subjective midpoint x of (0,j+1].  To derive c¼  from this midpoint x we corrected for 
the roundings.  Because we had used j+1 instead of c½ , which on average is an 
overestimation of c½  by ½ , and half of it will propagate into x, we subtracted ¼  from x 
to get c¼ .  In all other estimations of values cp we similarly used roundings and 
corrections.  Complete details of the roundings and corrections for all cp are in the 
web appendix. 
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Appendix 5.3 Details of the UM method 
 
Following EFB, we adopted power utility (Wakker 2008) and Prelec’s (1998) two-
parameter probability weighting: 
 If  > 0, then u(x) = x; 
 If  = 0, then u(x) = ln(x); 
 If  < 0, then u(x) = x; 
 w(p) = e(ln(p))

. 
For convenience, x is generic for outcomes in this appendix.  The average value of the 
utility parameter η was 0.47 (in EFB, η = 0.87), which reflects concavity.21  The 
average insensitivity index α was 0.55 (in EFB, α = 0.51), indicating departure from 
linear probability weighting.  The average estimates for the pessimism index β was 
0.94 (in EFB, β = 0.97). 
In Eq. 5.4.2 we should have U(0) = 0, which agrees with prospect theory’s scaling.  
Following EFB, the estimation of utility is carried out after shifting all outcomes by 
one unit of money, so as to avoid mathematical complications of logarithmic or 
negative-power utility at x = 0. 
We followed EFB in using choice lists to elicit  in Eq. 5.4.1 (details in the web 
appendix).  If the largest value in a choice list was still too small to lead to preference, 
we assumed preference to switch in the first higher value to follow.  We thus use 
censored data.  It gives a smaller bias than dropping these subjects, the most 
impatient ones, as done by EFB, and it keeps more subjects for other measurements.  
The DM measurements need no censoring of data because the indifference points are 
always between extremes of the choice lists. 
 
                                                             
21 The average value of the parameters in our analysis is based on 96 subjects (including subjects 
who have missing values).  EFB removed all subjects with missing values. 
97 
 
Chapter 6  | Conclusions 
 
This thesis examines decision making under uncertainty using both empirical and 
theoretical analyses. 
Chapter 2 analyzes a model with multiplier preferences. This is a popular model in 
macroeconomics and finance that was introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001). 
This model allows for a deviation from expected utility (the standard model) due to a 
different treatment of ‘ambiguous’ events. People make a guess of the probabilities of 
these events occurring, but do not know the exact probabilities.  
In its original form, the model with multiplier preferences can only capture ambiguity 
aversion, where people prefer known probabilities to unknown ones. This is not a 
problem on a macroeconomic level, but on a micro level, a substantial proportion of 
people is often ambiguity seeking: they prefer unknown probabilities to known ones.  
We give a preference foundation for an extension of multiplier preferences, such that 
it can be used to explain ambiguity-seeking behavior.  
We also show how extended multiplier preferences can be measured and thereby 
obtain a measure of ambiguity aversion that can easily be applied in empirical studies.  
A first application of this method on two large scale representative surveys 
(Netherlands & US) shows that a substantial fraction (around one third) of the 
population was indeed ambiguity seeking.  
Chapter 3 presents a study on the effects of time pressure on decision making under 
ambiguity. In a lab experiment with real incentives, subjects are asked to choose 
between risky and ambiguous bets. The ambiguous bets are based on the movement 
of the Amsterdam Stock Market Index (AEX), and therefore the probabilities 
associated with the outcomes are unknown. In the risky bets, however, outcomes are 
presented with their respective objective probabilities. In the treatment group, 
subjects have to state their preferences within a time limit. For the analysis of 
ambiguity, a new simplified method is introduced which relies on a tool called 
matching probability function to measure ambiguity behavior. Ambiguity behavior 
can be dissected into two components: ambiguity aversion and ambiguity-generated 
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insensitivity (a-insensitivity). Ambiguity aversion is an affective component that 
refers to how much less people like ambiguity as compared to risk, whereas a-
insensitivity is a cognitive component indicating how much less people understand 
ambiguity compared to risk. The results of this experiment demonstrate that time 
pressure does not change people’s reactions to ambiguity affectively; the ambiguity 
aversion component remains unaffected. However, the a-insensitivity component is 
negatively impacted by time pressure. Therefore, the results agree with past research 
showing that cognitive faculties are compromised under time pressure. 
Chapter 4 discusses how people update their beliefs under ambiguity from three 
approaches. One is the traditional Bayesian updating, where only ambiguity neutral 
behavior is accommodated. The other two approaches are non-Bayesian, introduced 
by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) (GS) as well as Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976) 
(DS) respectively, where both ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking behavior are 
accommodated. Under the framework of decision theory, this paper compares 
Bayesian and non-Bayesian updating in its model specification and numerical 
implications. Ambiguity attitudes affect not only static decisions, but also the way in 
which new information is incorporated. For an ambiguity averse (seeking) decision 
maker, GS updating leads to more pessimistic (optimistic) behavior than DS updating, 
and favorable or unfavorable information has a bigger (smaller) impact on GS 
updating than on DS updating.   
Finally, Chapter 5 introduces a new method to measure the temporal discounting of 
money. Unlike preceding methods, this method requires neither knowledge nor 
measurement of utility. It is easier to implement, clearer to subjects, and requires 
fewer measurements than existing methods. Because the method directly measures 
discounting, and utility plays no role, it is called the direct method (DM). The basic 
idea of the DM is as follows. Assume that a decision maker is indifferent between: (a) 
an extra payment of $10 per week during weeks 1-30; and (b) the same extra 
payment during weeks 31-65.  Then the total discount weight of weeks 1-30 is equal 
to that of weeks 31-65.  We can derive the entire discount function from such 
equalities.  Knowledge of utility is not required because it drops from the equations.  
Even though this method is elementary, it has not been known before. In an 
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experiment, we compare it with a traditional, utility based, method (UM) and find that 
the DM needs fewer questions than the UM but gives similar results.
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Samenvatting 
 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt beslissingen bij onzekerheid, zowel gebruik makend van 
theoretische als van empirische analyses. Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt een model met 
zogenaamde multiplier preferenties. Dit is een populair model in macro-economie en 
finance dat is geïntroduceerd door Hansen and Sargent (2001). Dit model laat 
afwijkingen van verwacht nut (het standaard model) toe door een verschillende 
behandeling van ambigue gebeurtenissen. Mensen doen een eerste schatting van de 
waarschijnlijkheid dat deze gebeurtenissen optreden, maar kennen niet de precieze 
kansen. In zijn oorspronkelijke vorm kan het model van multiplier preferenties alleen 
maar afkeer van ambiguïteit beschrijven, waar mensen bekende kansen prefereren 
boven onbekende kansen. Dit is geen probleem op macro-economisch niveau, maar 
op het micro niveau is een aanzienlijk deel van de mensen ambiguïteit zoekend: zij 
prefereren onbekende boven bekende kansen. We geven een preferentie-fundering 
aan het multiplier model zodanig dat het ook gebruikt kan worden om ambiguïteit 
zoekendheid te verklaren. 
We laten ook zien hoe het resulterende uitgebreide multiplier preferentie model kan 
worden gemeten en verkrijgen daarbij een maat van ambiguïteits afkeer die 
gemakkelijk kan worden toegepast in empirische studies. Een eerste toepassing van 
deze methode op twee grootschalige representieve enquetes (Nederland en de 
Verenigde Staten) toont dat een aanzienlijk deel (ongeveer 1/3) van de populatie 
inderdaad ambiguïteit zoekend is. 
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert een onderzoek naar de effecten van tijdsdruk op beslissen 
bij ambiguïteit. In een laboratorium experiment met real incentives wordt subjecten 
gevraagd te kiezen tussen riskante en ambigue prospects. De ambigue prospects zijn 
gebaseerd op de bewegingen van de Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX), en daarom 
zijn de kansen op de relevante uitkomsten hierbij onbekend. In de riskante prospect 
worden de uitkomsten echter gepresenteerd tezamen met hun objectieve kansen van 
optreden.  In de behandel groep moeten subjecten hun preferenties kenbaar maken 
binnen een tijdslimiet. Voor de analyze van ambiguïteit wordt een nieuwe 
vereenvoudigde manier ingevoerd die gebruik maakt van matching kansen.  Gedrag 
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onder ambiguïteit kan ontleed worden in twee componenten: afkeer en ambiguïteit-
gegenereerde ongevoeligheid (a-ongevoeligheid). Afkeer is een affectieve component 
die beschrijft in welke mate mensen ambiguïteit minder prefereren dan risico, terwijl 
a-ongevoeligheid een cognitieve component is die aangeeft hoeveel mensen 
ambiguïteit minder goed begrijpen dan risico.De resultaten van dit experiment tonen 
dat tijdsdruk geen invloed heeft op de reacties van subjecten op ambiguïteit in 
affectieve zin; de ambiguïteits component wordt niet beïnvloed door tijdsdruk. A-
ongevoeligheid wordt echter negatief beïnvloed door tijdsdruk. Daarom stemmen de 
resultaten overeen met eerdere onderzoekingen die ook toonden dat cognitieve 
factoren gecompromiteerd worden door tijdsdruk. 
Hoodstuk 4 onderzoekt hoe mensen hun geloof onder ambiguïteit updaten onder drie 
verschillende benaderingen. Een is de traditionele Bayesiaanse, waar alleen nautraal 
gedrag tov ambiguïteit mogelijk is. De andere twee benaderingen zijn niet-Bayesiaans, 
en zijn geïntroduceerd door Gilboa en Schmeidler (1993) (GS) en door Dempster 
(1967) en Shafer (1976), waarbij zowel ambiguïteit-afkerig en ambiguïteit-zoekend 
gedrag mogelijk is. In het raamwerk van beslissings-theorie vergelijkt dit paper 
Bayesiaanse en niet-Bayesiaanse updating betreffende numerieke implicaties.  
Houdingen tov ambiguïteit hebben niet alleen invloed op statische beslissingen, maar 
ook op de manier waarop nieuwe informatie wordt verwerkt. Voor een ambiguïteits-
afkerige (zoekende) beslisser leidt GS updaten tot meer pessimistisch (optimistisch) 
gedrag dan DS updaten, en gunstige of ongunstige informatie heeft een grotere 
(kleinere) invloed op GS updaten dan op DS updaten. 
Hoofdstuk 5, tenslotte, introduceert een nieuwe methode om het disconteren van 
geld te meten. In tegenstelling tot eerdere methoden vereist deze methode noch 
kennis noch een meting van utiliteit. Hij is makkelijker te implementeren, duidelijker 
voor subjecten, en vergt minder metingen dan bestaande methoden. Omdat de 
methode disconteren direct meet, en utiliteit geen rol speelt, heet hij de directe 
methode (DM). Het grondidee van de DM is als volgt. Veronderstel dat een beslisser 
indifferent is tussen: (a) een extra betaling van$10 per week gedurende weken 1-30; 
en (b) dezelfde betaling gedurende weken 31-65. Dan is het totale gedisconteerde 
gewicht van weken 1-30 gelijk aan dat van weken31-65. We kunnen de gehele 
disconterings-functie van zulke gelijkheden afleiden. Kennis van nut is niet nodig 
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omdat het uit de vergelijkingen weg valt. Zelfs hoewel deze methode elementair is, is 
hij niet eerder bekend geweest. In een experiment vergelijken we hem met een 
traditionele, utiliteits-gebaseerde, methode (UM) en vinden dat de DM minder vragen 
nodig heeft dan de UM maar gelijke resultaten geeft. 
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